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Abstract 
Germany’s relationship with Russia has long been regarded as ‘special’ and 
‘strategic’, and the evolution of Ostpolitik throughout the years has never lost sight of 
the original purpose: to increase ties between East and West. The annexation of Crimea 
marked a turning point in their relations, accounting for a major change in Germany’s 
Russia policy and opened the debate among scholars about continuity and change in 
German foreign policy. Drawing upon the theoretical framework of foreign policy 
change and continuity and based on the liberal and constructivist approaches, the study 
focuses on economic and geopolitical factors as main forces driving government’s 
decisions in interstate relations, and it seeks to evaluate their balance in determining 
Germany’s approaches towards Russia. With the purpose of assessing the nature of 
Germany’s Russia policy, this dissertation adopts the method of process tracing to 
investigate the causal mechanism behind Berlin’s responses in three different cases: the 
signing of Nord Stream deal, the Georgian conflict and the Ukraine crisis. Through the 
analysis of three focal events, the collection of economic data and the examination of 
Federal Government’s official statements, the following research argues that the 
geopolitical factor alone cannot account for the observed change; while the economic 
dimension plays a major role in determining Germany’s foreign policy outcomes vis-à-
vis Russia.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Today, as in the past, Germany’s relation with Russia is still regarded as one the 
most relevant factor contributing to the European and global stability. German-Russian 
relationship has always been of crucial importance in shaping the international political 
and economic scenario, and especially, the security order. Given its leading role in the 
European Union, in fact, the way in which Germany chooses to approach Russia, has 
strong implications at the European level.  
 
 The importance of German-Russian relations derives from the close historical ties 
of the two countries, already starting from the early modern era until the shared recent 
history of the XX century. Germany’s geographical position, contributed to the long 
tradition of alternately friendly and hostile relations with Russia, and has always 
allowed Germany to play the role of mediator or ‘bridge’ between East and West by 
promoting Russia’s integration into the European system and exporting political, 
institutional and cultural models to the East. After the Second World War, Germany’s 
eastern policy sought to maintain a balance and reduce tensions, preserving close 
contacts and negotiations with Russia. Nowadays, Germany is still a major interlocutor 
in discussing international policy, while the Russian Federation is considered both a 
valuable actor in European and global security, and the main energy supplier, thus 
playing a key role in shaping the long-term aims of Germany’s foreign policy. During 
the 1990s and 2000s, cooperation, interactions and goodwill have existed at many 
levels: in this sense, Germany has had a ‘special relationship’ with the Russian 
Federation, officially labelled as ‘strategic partnership’ and initially characterized by the 
close friendship between the leaders. The key tenets of Ostpolitik have not been 
contaminated neither by the change in Germany’s government coalition nor by some 
political and security tesions occured at the end of the 2000s; stable and constructive 
ties with Moscow have remained in Germany’s interest, thus presumably explaining the 
quick return to ‘business as usual’ after the Georgian war in 2008. However, since 2012 
a negative trend arise when Putin returned to the presidency and it came to a head in 
2014 with the Ukrainian crisis. German-Russian relations, since 2010s, have been in a 
state of change: if, previously, Germany’s Russia policy was driven by economic 
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interests, cooperation and ‘Russia first’ approach, after the latest geopolitical event the 
main element of its policy towards Russia has been the management of conflict.  
  
 The research area of the thesis concerns the primary focus of interstate relations on 
the specific case of German-Russian relationship, which is examinated through the 
lensis of the main factors that shape Berlin’s policy vis-à-vis Moscow. This work 
focuses principally on economic and geopolitical considerations, including also the 
clash between values and interests, as they are considered to be the main driving factors 
in influencing Germany’s relations with Russia: first, the economic and political 
engagement with Moscow was the core idea of Ostpolitik aimed at positive change in 
Soviet and post-Soviet Russia and, the emphasis on fostering economic and commercial 
cooperation had prevailed over other issues; secondly, geopolitical concern, especially 
in the case of Crimea’s annexation, has called into question the tenets of Ostpolitik and 
caused a deterioration of the relations, also assuming a reformulation of German foreign 
policy. The balance of these factors in foreign policy formation leads to the main 
research problem that the present work tries to address is determining to what extent the 
factors affect the relationship. In this light, the examination of the historical German-
Russian ties and the evolution of Germany’s Russia policy in the time period of the last 
two chancellorships (1998 – today), will serve the purposes of assessing the nature of 
Germany’s Russia policy and determining whether a significant shift in German foreign 
policy has taken place, when it happened and how deep is the change; moreover, the 
thesis will also explore German foreign policy in order to explain the continuity more 
than change, or vice versa. 
The choice of this particular timeline is determined by the intention to analyse the 
evolution of Germany’s Russia policy from ‘change through rapprochement’ to ‘change 
through interweaving’, up to the current and so-called ‘Frostpolitik’. Over these years 
Germany and Russia have been involved, in one way or another either as main actors or 
as spectators, in several events that have had significant impact in the international 
scenario: in July 2005, Germany and Russia signed the energy contract for the 
construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline that by-passes Eastern Europe and the 
Baltic states; in August 2008, Russian military intervention in Georgia and the 
recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states; in late 2013, 
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Kremlin’s support for separatism and military intervention in Ukraine, followed by the 
2014 annexation of Crimea. These episodes are evaluated as key defining moments in 
the development of German-Russian relations and they will be analysed by taking as 
benchmarks two main factors driving Germany’s Russia policy: economic interests and 
geopolitical concerns. Hence, the research question of the thesis is whether and how 
geopolitical events and economic interests determine Germany’s foreign policy towards 
Russia. 
 
Considerations on the primary focus of interstate relations on the German-Russian 
case are drawn from different German foreign policy approaches in the above-
mentioned cases. Economic and business interests account as major factors influencing 
Germany’s Russia policy, in fact, it is not by chance that the peak of their partnership 
was the construction and the commissioning of the Nord Stream pipeline. The 
increasing foreign trade, investments and large-scale joint projects between Germans 
and Russians has created a stable basis for the development of bilateral relations, in 
such a way that the 2008 conflict in Georgia, despite its geopolitical nature, did not have 
drastic consequences for German-Russian ties. The unexpected change of international 
borders in 2014 generated quite different reactions than the Georgian war did. The 
annexation of Crimea has been the turning point in Germany’s foreign policy towards 
Putin’s Russia, causing the shift of German focus from an economic interest-led 
Realpolitik to a value-based Moralpolitik. 
The aim of this work, then, is to demonstrate the balance of these two factors in 
determining Germany’s foreign policy approaches towards Russia. The final outcome 
will be an explanation of the balance between the higher relevance of one factor versus 
the lower relevance of the other factor. The main research task is therefore to measure 
the weight of economic interests and geopolitical concerns in the evolution of 
Germany’s Russia policy. 
 
The thesis analyses German-Russian relations as a single case study over a long 
period of time, and the process will mainly consist of two stages: a first tracking-phase 
of bilateral relations and a second explanatory-phase of the key defining moments 
through process-tracing method. 
9 
 
The reason behind the method of process-tracing is its ability to allow the study of 
casual mechanism and increase the number of observations by searching for intervening 
variables that link independent variables with dependent variables. By using this 
method, the key defining moments will be widely analyzed in the light of two 
independent variables, i.e. economic interests and geopolitical calculation, with the 
purpose to identify complex interaction effects in the dependent variable, i.e. German-
Russian relations, as well as to find out what makes the dependent variable change the 
way it does. Moreover, it will be possible to assess whether each of the independent 
variable in the cases of Nord Stream pipeline’s agreement, Georgian conflict and 
Crimea annexation can, or cannot, be ruled out as having causal significance. The 
higher relevance of one independent variable accounts for the lower relevance of the 
other independent variable, thus shaping Germany’s foreign policy decisions in its 
relations with Russia. The hypothesis suggests that keeping the other factors constant, if 
economic interests remain stable, meaning at the core of Germany’s Russia policy, no 
change can be expected in its relations with Russia, suggesting that their relationship 
remains stable. Consequently, keeping the other factors constant, if geopolitical concern 
prevails over lower economic interests, relations with Russia change.  
 
In the pursuit of the research objectives, the dissertation is divided into three main 
chapter. The first chapter provides the historical overview of German-Russian bilateral 
relations since the modern era until the current days, outlining the major developments 
during the period of the Cold War and after the German reunification, with particular 
emphasis on the comparison between the bilateral relationship under Merkel and 
Schröder. After outlining the historical background, the first chapter presents the 
literature review, delineating the social and theoretical relevance of the topic by briefly 
describing the main debates around the key issues: German foreign policy continuity 
and change, and the nature of Germany’s Russia policy. The theoretical framework is 
also contained in the first chapter. After clearly defining the meaning of ‘strategic’ and 
‘special’ relations, the chapter turns to the main theoretical approaches used in the 
analysis of German-Russian relationship, with a a detailed explanation of the concept of 
geopolitics and economy, in order to understand why they are considered the main 
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factor shaping the relationship. The first chapter ends with a theoretical overview of the 
theories accounting for foreign policy change and continuity. 
The second chapter is devoted to the description of methodology. The qualitative 
tool of process-tracing is widely described and, its three main variants are also outlined 
in details. Furthermore, the chapter defined the two major factors shaping foreign 
policy, geopolitcs and economic considerations, as independent variable, thus providing 
an explanation of their measurament and how the collection of empirical evidence is 
carried out.  
The empirical analysis and assessment of fidings is contained in the third chapter, 
which starts with the overview of German foreign policy with primary focus on its core 
concepts. The chapter, then, moves from the general foreign policy to the more specific 
Russia’s policy by outlining the key principles of Ostpolitik, its development into 
‘change through trade’ and the differences between Schröder’s ‘Russia first’ policy and 
Merkel’s Moralpolitik. This section contains the detailed analysis of the three major 
events, Nord Stream, Georgian conflict and Ukraine crisis, and it ends with the 
assessment of German foreign policy’s nature by summarising the empirical findings of 
the analysis.  
The last section of the thesis is devoted to drawing conclusion, which summarises 
the outcomes of the analysis and defines the extent of German foreign policy change 
vis-à-vis Russia.  
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Chapter 1. German Russian Relations in History, Literature and Theory 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: From the Modern Era up to 1945 
Angela Stent wrote that “it is impossible to understand current ties between Russia 
and Germany and the shadow they cast over Central Europe without examining the rich, 
ambiguous, and compelling mutual historical relationship of the two nations”1. The so-
called special relationship between Germany and Russia is not only the heritage of the 
fall of the Berlin wall, but it is the result of more ancient interactions which reach back 
at the beginning of the modern era, when Prussia became the main source of influence 
for the modernization of tsar’s empire2. The West was perceived by the Romanov 
dynasty as scientifically advanced, thus importing the German organisation of the state 
apparatus and administration; the Russian industrialisation was possible thanks to 
German industrials and assets; and German universities were taken as example for the 
first Russian universities, where the German influence on education, science, 
philosophy and trade increased to such an extent that Russians developed the German 
culture adoration. It is not a case that the most revolutionary socialist Russian 
movement had been inspired by German philosophers, from Feuerbach to Karl Marx. 
Moreover, German and Russian crown families were related to each other: Catherine 
the Great, born as Sophie Friederike von Anhalt-Zerbst-Domburg, was herself a 
German and her decree
3
 signed in 1763 had been a meaningful step in the history of 
German-Russian relations.  
 The congress of Vienna dealt with important territorial issues such as a new 
configuration of Germany, the reorganisation of central Europe, and Russia not only 
was part of the decisional process among the five Great Powers, but with the extension 
of Europe’s eastern border to the Urals, a significant portion of Russian empire became 
part of the European continent. The League of the Three Emperors created by Otto von 
Bismarck including Germany, Austria and Russia was another proof of the increasing 
actorness of the Russian Empire in the European and international arena. Starting from 
                                                          
1
 Stent, A., Russia and Germany Reborn:Unification, the Soviet Collapse and the New Europe, Princeton 
University Press, 2000 
2
 Handl, V. & Ehler, T., The German policy towards Russia – The Meaning of the context of the 
European Union, 2009-2011, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Prague 
3
 Manifesto to permit all foreigners to come into the Empire, allowing the immigration from the West. 
http://www.dw.com/en/catherine-the-great-and-the-russian-germans/a-16965100  
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the second half of the XIX century, Russian empire extented its borders up to the 
Balkans, while the military-diplomatic actions of Bismarck led to the creation of the 
German Reich that soon proved to be active on the international scenario. Santangelo, in 
his historical reconstruction of German-Russian relations, highlights the fact that the 
unification process of Germany was not hampered by the Russian expansion, which on 
the contrary favoured the rise of Germany as a post-Napoleon European power. The 
strategic alliance between the two empires created and kept the equilibrium among the 
European powers around the central power, Germany
4
. But the rising of imperialism, 
the conflicts in the Balkans and a new correlation of forces in Europe caused a 
reorientation of Russian empire’s foreign policy towards France and Great Britain, and 
the hostile attitudes toward Russia and Germany resulted in war hostilities.  
 Despite the results of World War I had not been positive for none of the two 
countries, however it provided the framework for the first peaceful agreement between 
Germany and the Soviet Russia. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk is in fact described by 
Walter Laqueur, in his study of German-Russian relations
5, as the “first milestone in 
Soviet-German relations”. The reason for such definition is that it brought about the end 
of the war between Russia and Germany, marking the first successful attempt to find a 
solution that was beneficial for both nations.  
 The following 1922 Treaty of Rapallo signed by the Weimer Republic and Soviet 
Russia was another step in the normalization of their political and economic relations. 
In the aftermath of the First World War, both countries found themselves diplomatically 
isolated from the rest of the world with the only way out to cooperate in order to meet 
the economic needs of both. The bilateral Treaty of Rapallo marked the strengthening of 
their economic and military ties and the mutual recognition as “favourite nation for 
commercial trade”6. According to Santangelo, the treaty served the USSR to emphasise 
the divergences among the capitalistic states, while for Berlin it represented the chance 
to economically look towards East to meet the enormous war reparations. 
 The diverging ideas and interests of Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany did not 
promise long-lasting and stable cooperation, especially as soon as Hitler put into 
practice his racial ideology. Political cooperation decreased as well as economic trade, 
                                                          
4
 Santangelo, S., Gerussia, Castelvecchi, Roma, 2016 
5
 Laqueur, W., Russia and Germany. A century of conflict, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965 
6
 Santangelo, S., Gerussia, Castelvecchi, Roma, 2016 
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while tensions between the countries increased on all levels until 1939. In the same year 
the famous Non-Aggression pact, also known as Molotov-Ribbentrop, was signed 
between Moscow and Berlin, creating hegemonic spheres of influence. The pact 
contained also a secret protocol regarding the partition of Europe into spheres of 
influence in case of a territorial rearrangement, which meant the political and territorial 
reconstruction of many states as well as their violation of sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and independence. The immediate result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was 
the aggression and division of Poland, which led to the outbreak of World War II. In 
1945, the Third Reich ceased to exist and the victors of the war, the Soviet Union and 
other allies, divided Germany both geographically and politically.  
 
The cold war and German Ostpolitik  
At the time when Germany and the capital of Berlin were divided into four 
occupational zones, the Soviet Union emerged as one of the two global superpowers, 
controlling vast territories in the Eastern Europe and pursuing the goal of creating a 
neutral Germany not dominated by the Atlantic orientation. The division of Germany 
corresponded with the division of Europe into two blocks separated by the “iron 
curtain”. Germany’s division was supposed to be a temporary solution7 to control the 
country until a new government could be installed, instead it hampered relations 
between East and West directly leading to political struggles.  
The Cold War lasted for almost 47 years, it symbolised the inner conflict of 
Germany and it is commonly used to describe the relationship between the Soviet Union 
and the United States after the end of World War II
8
. During the Cold War years, the 
prospect of a possible and further Soviet expansion induced the Western powers to form 
a joint security agreement, assuring a strong presence of the United States in Europe. In 
1949, North America and Western Europe founded the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), in response to which Soviet leaders signed in 1955 the Warsaw 
Pact. The two opposite blocks were both nuclear-armed and dominated Germany and 
the Cold War until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 
                                                          
7
 Harrison, E., The Post-cold War International System: Strategies, Institutions and Reflexivity, Routledge 
Taylor and Francis Group, 2004 
8
 Charles, C., Sean, R., & Dominic, S., The Significance of the Wall, The Rise and Fall of the Berlin Wall, 
Year 8 History Extenssion, 2012  
https://berlinwall.pressbooks.com/chapter/the-significance-of-the-wall  
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The military alliance was accompanied by the intention of Konrad Adenauer, the 
West German chancellor, to integrate Germany into the West. He developed the 
Westbindung or Westintegration, a foreign policy concept relying on the solid alliance 
with the West through a combination of military and economic integration to prevent 
the isolation of Germany and to contrast the Soviet hegemony
9
. The approach of the 
West German chancellor became known as the ‘Policy of Strength’10, suggesting that 
only a strong western alliance would eventually allowed the reunification of West 
Germany and therefore regaining the country’s sovereignty. To achieve this goal 
without becoming a geopolitical threat to Western Europe
11
, West Germany pursued a 
strategy aimed at binding its economy to those of the other European countries, in such 
a way to strengthen their ties, maximise the market opportunities and achieve economic 
prosperity, and at contrasting the communist threat by agreeing to operate within the 
NATO framework. After the death of Stalin, the dialogue between the countries’ leaders 
was opened up in a climate of mutual understanding: Adenauer recognised the 
importance of the dialogue with Moscow and the need to normalise relations between 
the two countries, for which purpose diplomatic relations were established in the late 
50s
12
.  
The construction of the Berlin wall in the summer of 1961 represented a low 
moment in German-Russian relations, as it indicated the closure of the border between 
the West and the East side and the return to conflicting relations.  
In 1969, after the fall of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) government, the 
new formed coalition between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the liberal Free 
Democratic Party (FPD) took over the German government and sought a new direction 
for the German foreign policy. The Social Democrats, led by the new chancellor Willy 
Brandt, initiated a détente policy in Europe known as Ostpolitk
13
. The idea of Ostpolitik 
was to create closer ties between East and West Germany and improve the relations 
with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries through the economic and 
                                                          
9
 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Westintegration https://www.konrad-
adenauer.de/stichworte/aussenpolitik/westintegration  
10
 Kleuters, J., Reunification in West German Party Politics From Westbindung to Ostpolitik, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012 
11
 Since 1871,  tensions between Germany and France had represented the spark for international 
conflicts. With the economic recover of West Germany, France’s concerns increased. 
12
 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Westintegration https://www.konrad-
adenauer.de/stichworte/aussenpolitik/westintegration 
13
 Translated in English with “new eastern policy” 
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political engagement
14. The cooperative approach of the “new eastern policy” was based 
on the concept of “change through rapprochement”, also known as Wandel durch 
Annäherung, formulated by the then political secretary, Egon Bahr who believed that 
economic and political engagement with Moscow would lead to positive change both 
within the Soviet Union and in bilateral relations. Relations between the FRG and the 
USSR, in fact, gradually improved: in 1970 the Ostverträge was signed in Moscow, 
opening the period of good diplomatic relations, confirming the ultimate goal of peace 
and security and fostering the economic cooperation by concluding the first deal of 
energy cooperation
15
.  
The legal recognition of the sovereignty of two German states and the European 
geographical division, the dètent policies of Ostpolitik and Westpolitk created the 
cooperative framework for the reconstruction of the European peaceful order, in which 
the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe took place. The 
confirmation of Germany as a solid partner for the neighbouring countries including 
Russia came also from Helmut Schmidt’s policy, which maintained the tenets of 
Ostpolitik enhancing relations with the East and paved the way for the unification of 
Germany, which happened under the chancellery of Helmut Kohl (1982-1998). In the 
meantime, in 1985 the Soviet Secretary General position was taken by Mikhail 
Gorbachev, who introducted new reforms to strengthen and open the economy and 
modernise the country, aiming at reforming the entire Soviet system and moving from a 
centralised government to a more liberal form. Gorbachev’s relation with Erich 
Honecker, leader of the East Germany, declined due to the German leader’s refusal to 
accept the Soviet reforms and his strong commitment to save the regime. In 1989, 
tensions and anti-Communist demonstrations in East Berlin increased and spread 
through East Germany calling for reconciliation and liberalisation. Honecker was forced 
to resign and in November of 1989, a mass of Berliners crossed the border into the 
Federal Republic of Germany without any reactions from the border control guards. 
Following the fall of the Berliner Mauer, Gorbachev and Kohl paved the way for 
                                                          
14
 Siddi, M., German Foreign Policy towards Russia in the Aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis: A New 
Ostpolitik?, Europe-Asia Studies, 68:4, 665-677, 2016 
15
 Stent, A., Russia and Germany Reborn:Unification, the Soviet Collapse and the New Europe, Princeton 
University Press, 2000 
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political reunification of Germany and for the rapprochement process of their country 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
 
German-Russian Relations After 1989 
The fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany and the subsequent 
disintegration of the Soviet giant favoured the positive development of their bilateral 
relations and the transformation of their foreign policies. In this framework of 
cooperative approach, a central role was played by the leaders of both countries, without 
which things could have been different. It has been already explained how Gorbachev’s 
Perestrojka was fundamental to the dissolution of the Iron Curtain and the reunification 
of Germany; in the same way, the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, had been supported 
by Kohl, both economically and politically, to favour Russian transition, also 
developing personal ties labelled by Alexander Rahr with the German expression 
Strategische Saunafreundschaft
16
; Schröder and Putin established not only a partnership 
between their respective countries but also a close friendship; and even though Angela 
Merkel never developed similar close ties with Putin, she got along with Dmitry 
Medvedev during his presidential term.  
The elapsed years between the collapse of the USSR and the election of Schröder as 
new German Chancellor in 1998 are characterized by challenges and efforts aimed at 
the economic, social and political reconstruction of the states. Both, the reunified 
Germany and the newborn Russian Federation, dealt with border and security issues, 
difficult relations with neighbours in the Eastern Europe
17
, and domestic issues. Russia 
did not face a cheerful transition to a democratic and liberal economy: high costs, public 
debt out of control, poverty and privatisation had been the direct results of the shock 
therapy, which had a huge impact on the political dimension too
18
. The role of Germany 
as an international actor was strongly linked to its commitment to the European 
integration process started in the 50s
19. Germany’s interests included the reconciliation 
with the former Warsaw Pact countries and Central European states, the promotion of 
                                                          
16
 Literally translated from German as “strategic sauna friendship”, their personal relationship is also 
called “sauna diplomacy”. 
17
 The dissolution of the USSR led to the formation of 15 independent republics, some of which were 
driven by a deep resentment towards Moscow. (Santangelo) 
18
 Santangelo, S., Gerussia, Castelvecchi, Roma, 2016 
19
 Kundnani, H., Germany as a Geo-economic Power, The Washington Quarterly, 2011 
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democratic development in those countries and also the internal stabilisation of Russia. 
The latter interest was not a sort of compensation for Russian support in Germany’s 
reunification, rather its central position allowed Germany to play the role of mediator 
between Russia and the West
20
, thus promoting closer relations with the Euro-Atlantic 
structures. The international system was changing fast and German efforts had been 
hampered both by the Chechnyan wars, and some major American foreign policy 
moves. NATO expansion towards East was of great concern for Russia due to the fact 
the Alliance was targeting those countries that used to be under the Soviet influence. 
Recognising the “sphere of influence” was exactly one of  the main goals of the new 
Russian president, Vladimir Putin, whose priority was “to make the West reckon with 
Russia”21. In 2000, Putin took over the presidency of a nation that was politically and 
economically declining and carried out a programme aimed at reconstructing the 
economy and regain the international prestige
22
. The new president consolidated the 
status apparatus by centralising it, defined the primacy of politics over economics and 
sought economic and beneficial relations with the West, which resulted in a strategic 
partnership with Schröder’s Germany.  
Coming to power in 1998, Gerhard Schröder was a strong supporter of the idea that 
security and stability in Europe were possible only through a cooperative relationship 
with the Russian Federation. Berlin intensified its engagement with Moscow at different 
levels and in different ways, therefore bringing the already existing Ostpolitik to a new 
dimension.  
 
 Bilateral Relation under Schröder’s Chancellorship (1998-2005) 
 Coming from the Social Democratic Party, Gerhard Schröder was appointed 
chancellor of Germany and leader of the SPD-Green coalition in 1998, taking a more 
critical and pragmatic stance to the fostering of political reforms in Russia than his 
predecessor, Helmut Kohl
23. However, in 2000 Schröder’s approach toward Russia 
                                                          
20
 Stent, A., Russia and Germany Reborn:Unification, the Soviet Collapse and the New Europe, Princeton 
University Press, 2000 
21
 EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_origins_of_russias_new_conflict_with_the_west330  
22
 Aron, L., The Putin’s Doctrine: Russia’s Quest to Rebuild the Soviet State, Foreign Affairs 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2013-03-08/putin-doctrine  
23
 Johnson, D., & Robinson, P., Perspective on EU-Russia Relations, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 
New York, 2005 
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changed as he found in the new president of the Russian Federation a leader “with an 
apparently similar approach towards politics”24. On the one side, Vladimir Putin was 
aware that Germany’s pivotal role25 inside the European Union could have helped 
Russia in regaining its international role and improving its relations with Western 
partners; on the other side, the German leader acknowledged the importance of Russia 
for European security, and equally for Germany’s own economic gain.  
 The first visit of Schröder to Moscow in 2000 was crucial to the development of 
political and personal relations between the two leaders, marking the beginning of a 
high engagement, otherwise known as “strategic partnership”. This partnership was 
characterised by the personal “man-to-man friendship”, common understanding26 and 
mutual trust, and strengthened by annual inter-governmental meetings taking place 
alternately in Berlin and Moscow. The economic dimension of the partnership was 
extremely important for both: Germany was becoming more and more dependent on 
exports, and its economy looking for new trade partners saw in Russia a huge potential 
market in which to invest; in exchange German exports and investments helped Russian 
modernisation and liberalisation process and increased Russia’s role as main energy, 
security and commercial partner. The 2001 St. Petersburg Summit “came as an 
important turning point in the official relations between Germany and Russia" as it 
announced the establishment of a bilateral governmental consultation process 
(Timmins, 2005). The creation of the Petersburg Dialogue in 2001, under the joint 
initiative of Putin and Schröder, aimed at promoting a strategic partnership for 
economic and political cooperation including the increase of mutual understanding 
between the two countries, the development of mutual cooperation in all social spheres 
and the increase of civil societies contacts between both nations
27
. Based on the 
German-Russian Forum, “a membership organisation founded in 1993 to improve 
mutual understanding between the countries”28, the Petersburg Dialogue provided a 
platform for bilateral discussions open not only to diplomats, politicians but also to 
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researchers, specialists and representatives of German and Russian business interests. 
As a demonstration of this renewed strategic cooperation, Timmins reported, in his 
study on Schröder-Putin relationship, that the German chancellor few days before the 
summit published a statement on Germany’s Russia policy, where he declared that 
Russia was the main priority for Germany as well as for the EU
29
. The same quotation is 
also reported by Adomeit, when describing the trends of German-Russian relationship’s 
development he refers to this policy as a “relentless Russia first policy”30. By defending 
Putin’s credibility “as a champion of democracy”31 and as “lupenreiner Demokrat32”, 
Schröder made his strong personal interests prevailing over the international concern 
about Russia’s violations of human rights and lack of democratic development and of 
rule of law
33
, whereas favored and deepened economic ties. 
 As Stefan Meister argues, German business interests influence Germany’s Russia 
policy significantly and the business community had always supported the policy of 
“change through rapprochement”. Under Schröder’s chancellorship, economic relations 
developed to such an extent that Germany became the most important trading partner 
within the EU
34
 and a major partner in energy trade. Indeed, it is no coincidence that 
one of the main pillars of German-Russian relationship was established under 
Schröder’s government and concerned the energy cooperation over the construction of 
Nord Stream gas pipeline. The joint venture agreement was signed in 2005 in Berlin 
between the German E.ON and Russian Gazprom, thus increasing Germany’s and 
Europe’s dependency on Russian gas and oil.  
 Schröder’s new Ostpolitik, known as Realpolitik, and the overall strategically close 
German-Russian ties had an impact on the general relations of the EU with the Russian 
Federation, causing growing criticism and increasing concern in Brussels and among 
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Schr der’s critics mainly for two reasons. First, the Nord Stream project signed with 
Russia did not take into consideration the interests of Poland and those of the new 
European member states, the Baltics. Second, his assertive foreign policy turned to the 
“German way”35 with regard to national interests, as demonstrated by German 
opposition to the US invasion of Iraq in 2002. Germany’s alignment with Russia and 
France in opposing the United States on the Iraqi war together with Schröder’s priority 
to relations with Russia rather than with the EU’s new members, and his lack of concern 
for Russia’s non-democratic tendencies worsened its relations with the East European 
countries and increased doubts about the future reliability of Germany; furthermore, the 
poor economic performance of the last years under Schröder as chancellor undermined 
its diplomatic influence
36
.  
 The chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder ended in 2005 after the vote of no-
confidence in the Bundestag. The early called election caused a change of power in 
Germany by placing on the German chancellor’s chair the leader of the conservative 
opposition: Angela Merkel.  
 
Bilateral Relation under Merkel’s Chancellorship (2005 - today) 
 Angela Merkel, leader of the Christian Democratic Union, took over the office of 
Chancellor of Germany in November 2005, after that she became the first woman at the 
head of the grand coalition CDU/CSU and SPD.  
 Contrary to her predecessor, she did not focus on pursuing personal ties with the 
Russian President and made clear to be highly committed to multilateralism and respect 
of international values and human rights. The special relationship with Russia was not 
the priority for the new Bundeskanzlerin, that kept distance from Moscow and re-
oriented her foreign policy on a value base, thus suggesting that the “strategic 
partnership” had come to an end37. In fact, as Meister reported, the labels “special” and 
“strategic” were not used anymore to describe the cooperation, and she did not refrain 
from expressing her concern about Russia’s domestic situation on human rights in 2006 
at the meeting with President Putin. In addition, the new chancellor was willing to 
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resume good relations with Germany’s East European neighbours and took a critical 
stance towards Russia’s move to cut off oil and gas deliveries to Ukraine in 2006, 
declaring that Putin by acting without consultation was betraying Germany’s trust and 
hampering the basis of their cooperation
38
. Although she was openly critical of Russia, 
highlighting the German-Russian divergences with regard to human rights, common 
norms and war in Chechnya, Merkel continued to foster on commercial and economic 
cooperation, given Germany’s growing energy dependency on Russia and common 
economic interests. In 2007, during the Petersburg Dialogue’s meeting in Wiesbaden, 
she defined the economic pillar as the main developed and substantive one (Dent, 
2004), on which bilateral relations between the two nations are built and which needs to 
be better integrated with the international political and socio-cultural dimensions 
(Santangelo, 2016).  
The economic engagement with Moscow was considered an incentive for the 
modernisation of Russian economy, supported by the German government’s policy of 
“change through interweavement”. Already drafted in 200639, the Annäherung durch 
Verflechtung sounded as a recall of the Brandt’s Ostpolitik concept of “change through 
rapprochement”. The idea was to broaden exchanges and enhance the already existing 
links in all dimensions, from education to trade, in order to modernise Russia and 
integrate it into the rule-based Western system. The initiative was realised within the 
framework of the “Modernisation Partnership”, announced in 2008 by German Foreign 
Minister as a mutual beneficial partnership: Germany would have supported Russia’s 
reforming of politics, implementation of rule of law and better conditions for small and 
medium-sized companies
40
, and in exchange it would have increased export and 
investment opportunities of German industries in Russia; while Russia would have had 
access to Western technology and would have benefited from investments and 
economic transfers.  
As it has been observed by many scholars including Adomeit, Meister and Forsberg, 
during Merkel’s first term in office, despite the Merkel-Putin partnership lacked the 
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personal level between leaders and more emphasis was put on norms and rights’ 
respect, Germany’s policy towards Russia did not change dramatically. The main reason 
for this continuity in foreign policy, which will be further analysed in the following 
chapters, was the presence of a strong Russia’s supporter in the foreign ministry’s 
office. Frank Walter Steinmeier (SPD) has been focused on cooperation and integration 
with the Russian Federation, which was considered the priority for Germany
41
, and he 
was the main author of the implementation of the already mentioned “Modernisation 
Partnership”. The further development of this partnership was also possible thanks to 
the more West-oriented foreign policy of the new Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, 
which took over the presidency in May 2008. With the new Russian presidency, it 
seemed that German-Russian relations were moving along a comprehensive line since 
Medvedev aimed at modernising the economy, fighting corruption and maintaining 
good relations with the West. His policy was supported by the German chancellor, 
whose expectations from Medvedev’s announced reform were very high. 
 The warm relationship between the leaders did not prevent different interests and 
values to clash. If Germany was using the economic cooperation as a tool to influence 
Russia in adopting more democratic practices, on the other side Russia was more 
interested in the economic gain and less in pursuing democratic policies as 
demonstrated by the lack of progress in establishing the rule of law and transparency
42
. 
As pointed out by Adomeit, evidence of this disengaged will to cooperate can be 
observed also in the fact that none of the frozen conflicts in the former Soviet space had 
been solved, despite Germany “did urge Russia to adopt a constructive approach to 
solve them”43. The 2008 Georgia war became one of those conflicts as well as one of 
the “defining moment”44 in the framework of EU and Russia relations. Russian outbreak 
in Georgia came as a surprise to Germany and to the West, which could not do anything 
to prevent the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions as independent states. 
The security dimension, especially if related to the post-Soviet neighbourhood, became 
a field of important cooperation between Moscow and Berlin. Germany’s commitment 
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to the European security has been extremely high as proved by its efforts to integrate 
Russia in the European security puzzle: in 2010, for instance, Angela Merkel and 
Dmitry Medvedev agreed on the Meseberg Memorandum, an agreement, established 
within the framework of the EU-Russia security council, according to which Russia 
committed itself to cooperate in the resolution of Transnistria conflict with Moldova, 
thus proving to be a reliable security partner
45
.  
 Relations with Russia entered a new stage when Putin announced his return to 
presidency for his third term. In 2012, it has been registered a lowering of good 
relations between the two countries, demonstrated by the growing disagreement in the 
2012 German-Russian summit. Germany questioned the cooperative relations that the 
two countries used to have by accusing Russia of limiting freedoms and violating 
human rights. As reported by Forsberg, the “Modernization Partnership” was losing its 
significance and the idea of “change through trade”, introduced by Guido Westerwelle, 
was replaced by “trade without change46”. Criticism towards Putin’s regime did not 
come only from the West. In the same year, first signs of opposition became visible also 
among Russians and they resulted in large protest demonstrations against Putin, such as 
the Pussy Riot protest, which was largely covered by Western media, fomenting the 
Western disapproval toward Russian government policies.  
In the following years, tensions and mutual distrust arose: violations of human right 
and Russian anti-gay laws only proved that “Germany’s idealistic Russia is not 
compatible with Putin’s realpolitik”47. The lowest point in their bilateral relations has 
been the annexation of Crimea in 2014, which is a proof of Putin’s zero sum game, 
where other’s loss is his gain.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Given that the problem of German stance towards Russia after 2014 events, and 
more precisely the delicate balance between its economic interests and geopolitical 
concerns, is quite current and constantly developing, it makes difficult to find academic 
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books about the specific issue. Looking for literature to answer the research question, it 
becomes clear that academic journals and studies do not sufficiently cover the central 
issue and that the number of valid academic sources, especially in regard to the current 
situation following the Ukrainian crisis, is quite limited. The relationship between 
Germany and Russia has been widely studied until the current diplomatic crisis, and 
there have also been conducted perspectives until 2025 by Hannes Adomeit. The 
present work will evaluate several studies and reports to define the general positive 
direction of their cooperation until the current state of affairs. Starting from a brief 
historical overview, the work will focus on the comparison of bilateral relations under 
the last two chancellorship, supporting the thesis that continuity had been the major 
foreign policy direction of the German government.  
The historical perspective of German-Russian relations is based on a journal article 
written by the German scholar Alexandr Rahr, who evaluates their relationship as a 
“special partnership”. According to him, the countries “are destinated to have a special 
relationship”48, because already from the Soviet period both countries were important 
trade partners, thanks to West Germany’s policy known as Ostpolitik aimed at 
improving relations with the Soviet block, thus assuming the role of mediator between 
the West and the East. Angela Stent and Hannes Adomeit focused on the period after 
the reunification of Germany and the fall of the Soviet Union by tracing the path of 
German-Russian relations from the Soviet regime to the European integration in details, 
and providing an analysis of the Soviet policy and the post-communist developments. 
Chivvis and Rid investigate the roots of Germany’s Russia policy, dedicating a great 
section of their work to the historical relationship, which according to the authors 
“continues to weigh heavily on politics today”49. In The roots of Germany’s Russia 
policy, the authors point out the difficulty faced by Germany to take aggressive 
positions towards Russia and the important role played by history in shaping 
contemporary Germany’s positive perception of Ostpolitik. Therefore, they argue that 
its key principles towards Russia will not be changed in the short term. Tuomas 
Forsberg, in his recent work From Ostpolitik to ‘frostpolitik’, bringing out the Ostpolitk 
of Germany, explains its meaning, its key principles and the differences in the period of 
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the last two chancellorships. The aim of his article is to understand whether a major 
change in Germany’s Russia policy has in fact taken place, and what he brings up is the 
concept of continuity in regard to the concept of Ostpolitik. First, the author uses 
Welch’s theory of foreign policy change to explain “the endurance of the Ostpolitik 
tradition irrespective of changes in the government coalition”, and later to explain the 
supposed foreign policy change as Welch argues that “foreign policy change is more 
likely in the domain of losses, which was clearly the case in respect of Ostpolitik, 
defined as an attempt to bring Russia closer to the rest of Europe while preserving the 
agreed fundaments of the European security order”50. As mentioned in the first 
paragraph, this work will prove Forsberg’s arguments, arguing that changes in German 
domestic politics did not influence foreign policy decisions to such an extent, rather 
emphasising the tendency that foreign policy is often based on the country’s own 
economic interests. 
The question of continuity more than change in Germany’s foreign policy towards 
Russia has engaged several scholars, each of which puts forward the reason for 
continuity or change. In Jonas Wolff’s article51, Democracy promotion and civilian 
power: the example of Germany’s ‘Value-oriented’ foreign policy’, the author clearly 
states that “continuity is the main feature characterising German policy” due to the 
strong interest of Germany to ensure good economic cooperation with the Russian 
Federation, and he also adds that “normative concerns as to the political situation in 
Russia have had a limited impact on actual (German) policies at best”. In its relations 
with the Russian Federation, Germany has always sought to export Western values as 
part of its Russia’s foreign policy: Steinmeier’s “Modernization Partnership” and 
Westerwelle’s “change through trade” were aimed at the promotion of Civilian power’s 
democratic values as well as they represented German efforts to continue a policy of 
engagement with the Russian partner. 
In 2011, three years after the Russo-Georgian war, Timmins regarded Germany’s 
energy dependency on Russia as one of the main priorities driving continuity in German 
foreign policy. As well as Chivvis and Rid, Timmins’ article is dated before the 
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annexation of Crimea, which is described by the researcher Schmidt-Felzmann as a 
pivotal turning point in the EU’s relations with Russia52. The fundamental rupture in 
this relations, regarded by Felzmann as a failure to develop mutually beneficial 
cooperative relations with Moscow, have led to the  mistrust of Russia, which has been 
no longer regarded as “trustworthy political and trade partner”. According to Mischke 
and Umland, the German government’s reaction to the crisis have been an indication 
“that Germany’s strategy toward Russia may be undergoing more than just a temporary 
shift”53. In Germany’s New Ostpolitik, the researchers declare the possibility of German 
foreign policy entering a new era, emphasizing the controversial role of Steinmeier: 
supporter of sanctions against Russia and simultaneously supporter of the cooperation 
with Russia.  
One of the scholar that by contrast openly supports the change in German-Russian 
relations is Stefan Meister, who already in 2012 declared that their relations were in a 
state of change
54
 and in 2015 published the article Politics trump economics, where 
asserted how “the Ukrainian crisis marked three fudamental changes in German-Russian 
relations”55 highlighting the shift from economic interests to political interests. The 
issue of ‘politics trump economics’ has been supported also by John Lough, who 
declared that “Berlin has moved from its long-established view of Russia as a country 
that it should embrace to one whose great power ambitions it must resist.”56 Despite the 
economic damage from sanctions, the author argues that this time politics has prevailed, 
even though, stressing German historical ties with Russia, “this is not a position with 
which (Germany) feels naturally comfortable.” The present paper will challenge these 
positions by arguing that despite the decision to impose sanctions and the impact of 
sanctions on German economy, the immediate change in German policy is not 
determining for a complete shift in German-Russian relations, which key principle is a 
cooperative partnership that benefits not only Germany and Russia but Europe as well.  
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Concerning economic interests and geopolitical concerns, factors that influence 
bilateral relations between Germany and Russia, some scholars argue that despite the 
annexation of Crimea and the Ukrainian crisis, it cannot be declared a fundamental 
change in German foreign policy toward Russia because of the importance of economic 
cooperation. Szabo’s main claim is that “big business runs the show in Berlin”, thus 
reducing the role of politics. He thinks that German foreign policy is subordinated to 
business interests because its “commercial Realpolitik privileges the country’s 
economic well-being above all other interests”57. Szabo’s statement reflects the strong 
realist view of economy as the ultimate goal of state’s foreign policy, but it is also 
linked to the liberal assumption that states’ behaviour reflects the preferences of state’s 
groups, in this case the preference of the Russlansversteher group. In his attempt to 
investigate the shift in Germany’s Ostpolitik, Marco Siddi, comes to the conclusion that 
even if economics is not sufficient anymore to ensure stable and cooperative relations 
with Putin, German foreign policy is mainly focused on the economic agenda, as Russia 
is considered a key energy supplier. However, he suggests a new type of German 
foreign policy, which combines diplomacy and economic engagement. This approach 
will be used in the thesis to explain the controversial role of Germany as a Civilian 
power using diplomacy for de-escalating the crisis and simultaneously supporting the 
venture project of Nord Stream. 
Besides the economic factors, Chivvis and Rid underline the importance of 
geopolitics in Germanys’s Russlandpolitik. They understand geopolitics as the politics 
of geography, arguing that the closeness of the two countries has always influenced 
Germany’s Russia policy, thus leading to political consequences. Anyway, they retain 
energy to be the essential factor in German-Russian contemporary relationship. Ulrich 
Speck emphasizes the geopolitical aspect in regard to the Ukrainian crisis, sustaining 
that “the entire geopolitical order to the country (Germany)’s East is at stake”58. He 
argues that Russia’s imperialist attitude in its attemp to challenge the status quo is likely 
to risk the geopolitical order in the eastern German neighborhood, which is of great 
concern for Merkel as it is vital for German security and prosperity. Alongside 
geopolitical concerns there are those values, which cannot be overwhelmed in any way 
                                                          
57
 Moravcsik, A., Germany, Russia, and the rise of geo-economics; the paradox of German power, 
CAPSULE REVIEW, Foreign Affairs, 2015 
58
 Speck, U., German power and the Ukraine conflict, Carnegie Europe, 2015 
28 
 
and that can come to shape the policy response to certain actions. Forsberg defines the 
German policy change as a “program change”, focusing on the shift from economic 
interests to ‘defend the main values’ in shaping Germany’s Russia policy. He describes 
the change as “more than a mere ‘adjustment’ but less than an ‘international orientation 
change’”. While those studies look at these factors individually and explain Germany’s 
Russia policy by reference to either economics, or geopolitics, this thesis uses these two 
as two alternative competing explanations in accounting for Germany’s Russia policy.  
It will be, thereby, check for relative explanatory power of one set of factors over the 
other.   
According to Hans Kundnani the main problem in explaining German foreign 
policy is “how to understand the apparent contradiction between the harder edge of 
Germany’s pursuit interest within Europe and its continuing reclutance to use military 
force”59. In his view, Germany is trying to emerge as a new form of power in 
international relations, namely as a geo-economic power. The concept draws from the 
traditional understanding of the Federal Republic as a “civilian power”, whose foreign 
policy goals are achieved using multilateral institutions and economic cooperation, 
avoiding the use of military force. Kundnani supports his theory by adducing to 
international relations professor Hanns W. Maull, who argued that the foreign policy 
aim of a civilian power “is not simply to improve economic performance of prosperity 
but to civilize international relations through the development of the international rule 
of law”60.   
Considering the above mentioned arguments, where each scholar conveys its 
explanation for considering either economics or geopolitics the driving factor, this 
thesis will investigate the main reasons for Russia’s foreign policy continuity after the 
2008 Georgian war and the ostensible change after the 2014 Ukrainian crisis by 
analysing the geo-political and geo-economic context both internationally and 
domestically.  
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 “Foreign policy is an interaction between forces originating outside the country’s 
borders and those working within them”. The definition provided by the British 
Professor of International Relation, Frederick Northedge, suggests that foreign policy is 
the main tool of sovereign states to relate to each other and to the global system. It is the 
major instrument to influence other states and to achieve domestic and international 
goals, thus ensuring states’ vital interests in regard to economy, security and power. 
Henry Kissinger provided a different approach to the concept’s explanation by adducing 
that “foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends”61, which cannot be longer 
considered a proper definition due to the increased globalisation and the subsequent 
disappearance of national borders. 
 The purpose of this section is to provide a theoretical overview on foreign policy 
with particular focus on theoretical approaches to the study of special relationship 
between Germany and Russia, and on theoretical approaches that account for change 
and continuity in foreign policy.  
 
 German-Russian ‘special’ and ‘strategic’ Relations 
 First of all, it is necessary to clearly define the main concept of ‘special’ and 
‘strategic’ relations between the two countries. In his studies, Hannes Adomeit often 
uses these two adjectives to describe the close ties between Germany and Russia with 
reference to the fact that they are historically, geographically, culturally and 
economically connected. Their relationship has been built throughout the centuries, as 
explained in the chapter dedicated to the historical background. Germany has been 
Russia’s privileged partner in Europe for long time, which in turn has exerted an 
enormous influence on Russia in several fields, given birth to the “German factor”.   
The German director of the Korber Centre for Russian and CIS affairs, Alexander 
Rahr, entitled an article “Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship” explaining the 
historical reasons for such classification. Germany has played the role of bridge 
between East and West during the Cold War, becoming an important trade partner for 
the USSR first, and subsequently for the Russian Federation. He highlights the goodwill 
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and social interactions existing between the nations, the elites and public opinions, and 
despite the increasing skepticism following the recent events
62
, he believes in the 
constructive role of Germany as Russia’s favourite partner. Emphasis to the history was 
given also by Karl Schlogel, author of the chapter “About Russian-German Special 
Relations in the Twentieth Century”. He outlines the interwoven historical, cultural, 
economic and political path that dominated the XX century Europe and which has made 
their relationship ‘special’.  
By citing the website of the German Foreign Ministry, Adomeit translates the 
German expression Sonderbeziehungen in the English ‘special relationship’, proving 
that the label is commonly used among experts, politicians and scholars. The other 
frequent classification is ‘strategic’, often associated with the noun ‘partnership’. 
‘Strategic partnership’ is a label used with reference to the mutual favourable terms of 
the partnership. Gernot Erler, for example, minister of state from 2005 to 2009, 
illustrated the bilateral energy dependency as a cornerstone of the strategic partnership, 
thus understanding it as a mutual dependence; whereas Gerhard Schröder, who had a 
personal friendship with Putin, publicly declared that “Germans and Russians were 
closely aligned and united by a strategic partnership for a peaceful, prosperous 
Europe”63, implying that a good cooperation with Putin was necessary for the European 
order. 
Therefore, in view of what has been evaluated, this work understands and uses the 
labels ‘strategic partnership’ and ‘special relationship’ to describe German-Russian 
bilateral relations by referring to the mutual historical understanding, geographical 
proximity and economic dependency. Taking into account Meister’s statement that 
“Germany has been an advocate of Russian interests in the European Union and a 
strategic partner with regard to energy and economic cooperation”64, the thesis 
interprets these labels also as a classification of the peculiar German approach towards 
Russia, which in turn has always considered Berlin as the main European reference 
partner. It had been an integrative approach, according to which German policies 
supported and implemented liberal and democratic reforms in Russia, thus creating a 
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multilateral platform for Moscow’s integration into international structures on the 
intergovernmental level. As declared in 2009 by the Osteuropa Zeitschrift, “The relation 
towards Russia was and is seen as the last logical step that should finish the process of 
uniting Europe”65. 
 
Theoretical Approaches 
 The ‘special’ and ‘strategic’ relations between Germany and Russia can be studied 
within the framework of different approaches: Realism, Constructivism and Liberalism. 
The theoretical approaches used in this academic work are the liberal approach, which 
has been considered by several scholars as the most appropriate one in explaining 
German-Russian interactions, and the constructivist approach, necessary to understand 
the role of civilian power. The liberal approach focuses on the domestic factors that 
shape foreign policy formation, while the constructivist one explains the relations of 
power in the international system. Despite the (neo-) realist approach, which emphasises 
state power, national interests and includes geopolitical thinking, has been left aside, a 
specific explanation on geopolitics and geopolitical thought is relevant, given that the 
thesis considers the geopolitical factor as one of the main features influencing foreign 
policy decisions. Considering geopolitics as a subset of the realist theory of 
international relations, it does not focuses only on power of states, but also on the space 
in which the power is exerted. In this regard, it has been dedicated a sub-chapter on 
geopolitics as one of the intervening variables.  
 
 The main factors that shape foreign policy are internal and external factors. The 
internal factors include societal values, individual interests, preferences of domestic 
actors within the state, while external factors are the influences of foreign nations in the 
international system. Foreign policy decisions are taken on the basis of the linkage of 
both factors, and the balance between domestic and external factors, such in the case of 
Germany’s foreign policy after the 2014 events, can lead to foreign policy change 
toward specific countries. 
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Geopolitics And Economy: The Driving Factors 
The fall of the Berlin wall, the German reunification, the collapse of the USSR 
reshaped the European borders, and brought the German-Russian relationship to a new 
dimension, characterized by an intense cooperation between the two countries. This 
lasted until the Ukrainian crisis. The Russian annexation of Crimea has been a serious 
geopolitical turning point, able to change German attitudes toward its always old friend-
enemy and endanger its economic gains.  
Geopolitics 
Colin Dueck, Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, explains the 
concept of “geopolitics” simply indicating it as the “analysis of the relationship betwen 
geographical facts on the one hand, and international politics on the other.”66. Øyvind 
Østerud, professor emeritus of University of Oslo, defines geopolitics as the joining link 
between political power and geographical space. Michael Mayer, visiting research 
fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, offers a more detailed 
explanation of the concept by including the importance of primacy state actorness, the 
military-economic competition for raw materials and ability of states to prevail over 
other territories by securing political influence or through physical occupation.
67
  
Throughout the following centuries, the word “geopolitics” assumed multiple 
definitions due to the historical moment and geographical perception of the world. The 
conceptualisation of the concept of “geopolitics” has never come to a universal 
conclusion, it has been formulated many times and there are several conceptions and 
approaches to it. The academic literature provides many definitions of the concept, 
widely discussed by many prominent scholars and theorists such as Taylor, Cohen, Flint 
in a still open debate. “Geopolitics” refers also to a theory of international relations, 
which focuses not only on world politics and power of nations, but also on how 
relations between states are conducted and affected by the changing world. Two of the 
main classical theorists, according to the aforementioned scholars, of the concept of 
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“geopolitics” are Halford Mackinder and his opponent, Nicholas Spykman, who offered 
different approaches to the geopolitical framework of the Eurasian continent.  
Mackinder’s theory, known as the Heartland Theory, is based on the idea that the 
Eurasian continent, the Heartland sorrounded by the “Inner” and the “Outer Crescent”, 
served as the pivot of all geopolitical transformations given its central and geo-strategic 
position in the world map
68
. His assumption was that the conflict between sea-based 
power and land-based power would be won by the land power, which would be able to 
dominate the world by controlling the Heartland. As Østerud explained, the Heartland 
comprising both the Central and Eastern Europe, was the key to world dominance and 
“the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was a political manifestation of the strategic 
implications” of the Heartland theory. Based on the Heartland Theory and adopting 
Mackinder’s geographical division, Nicholas Spykman developed his own geopolitical 
model arguing that the Inner Crescent, which he called Rimland, was historically the 
most dominant power, namely the key to global hegemony for locational reasons
69
. 
Spykman’s view of the Heartland correspondes simply to a geographical area exposed 
to cultural and civilisation influence coming from the Rimland. He rejected Mackinder’s 
assumptions and rather stated that those who rule the Rimland can therefore dominate 
the world. The Rimland Theory was influential during the Cold War, when the USSR 
almost accomplished the theory seeking to gain control over the Heartland and the 
Outer Crescent. It was a bipolar competition between the Heartland Soviet Union and 
the maritime alliance of the United States in the territory of Eurasia, also known as 
Rimland and described by Cohen as “a large, strategically located region that is 
occupied by a number of conflicting states and is caught between the conflicting 
interests of adjoining Great Powers”70. 
Both theories are relevant to the issue of this thesis, because, as briefly mentioned 
before, they had a major impact on government policy respectively in the Nazi Germany 
and in the USSR during the Cold War period. Mackinder’s thought became prominent 
in German geopolitical discourses in the post war period, when geopolitics was highly 
influenced by the outcomes of the First World War. The main concepts of these 
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discourse rotated around the well known terms of Lebensraum
71
 and Mitteleuropa
72
, 
determining the primary importance of geography in state’s decision and strategy 
making; and paving the way for the expansion of the Third Reich. German 
geopgraphers “sought to actively shape politics according to what they regarded as the 
geographically given needs of the German Reich”73, and believed in the deterministic 
idea that weak states pursued defensive strategies, while strong states naturally 
expanded
74
.  
Spykman’s theory of Rimland was relevat during and after the Second World War 
as it was a war characterised by mixed alliances over control of the Rimland, which was 
neither an entirely land area nor an entirely sea area
75. Based on Spykman’s 
assumptions, in the post World War II period, it was in the interest of the United States 
to prevent consolidation of the hostile powers in the Rimland. The strategic imperative 
was to prevent the Soviet occupation and therefore the Soviet hegemony of the Rimland 
by developing a containment strategy. Scholvin argues that Spykman’s geopolitical 
theory not only had been able to shape world politics for half a century, but it also 
works as explanation for the EU enlargement and NATO expansion to the East. The 
theory highlights the closeness of Central Europe to the Western world and helps to 
understand the recent move of Russian Federation to expand into the European 
Rimland, by its occupation of Crimea. 
 
Nowadays, the term “geopolitics” is often mentioned in international news 
broadcasts with the meaning of ‘world politics’ or ‘international political strategy’, 
referring to international boundary disputes and to indicate geographical and political 
changes
76
. The current international system is the competitive arena, where great 
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powers play their own role as decision makers and put into practice their strategies. 
Russian aggression against Ukraine and the subsequent annexation of part of the 
Ukrainian territory has brought again to light the issue of geography and security, 
bringing back the use of term “geopolitics” to such an extent to recall the geopolitical 
changes of the last century. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the following 
reunification of Germany led to profound changes in the European, and not only, 
geopolitical order. The geopolitical dimension is fundamental in order to understand the 
dynamics of the German-Russian relations, and the role of Germany as European 
leading country in the EU-Russia relations; their common history contains many central 
geopolitical events such as the Dreikaiserbund
77
 (1872-1881), the Rapallo Treaty 
(1922), the Operation Barbarossa (1941), the World War II (ended in 1945), the 
division of Germany (1949), until the more recent 2008 and 2014 crisis and the Nord 
Stream projects of energy cooperation.
78
 The European continent has been the scenario 
of many geopolitical actions, which in the XXI century “profoundly altered the 
geopolitical equilibrium in Europe and in the rest of the world, paving the way to new 
possibile scenarios”79.  
Hence, the geopolitical dimension, despite the several and sometimes challenging 
definitions of it, has always been a crucial framework for states’ relations, reflecting 
international realities and constellation of power.  
 
Among the main driving forces operating within the geopolitical dimension, Mayer 
distinguishes the economic aspect as one of the major influences for developments 
between states. “The military-economic competition inspires geopolitical reasoning”80, 
as demonstrated in the specific case of German-Russian relations: in 1991 despite the 
geopolitical order has been reversed, the USSR could still play the energy card, to 
which Germany was highly dependent. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Berlin 
and Moscow has shared vital political-economic interests. 
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Economy 
In the dynamics of German-Russian relations, a central role is played by the 
economic interests. Since the beginning of Nineties, Germany has privileged 
commercial and economic ties first with the Soviet Russia, and later with the Russian 
Federation
81
. The economic dimension of this relationship has favoured the 
development of strong diplomatic and cultural ties as well as paved the way to several 
cooperations and energetic projects.  
Trade and economic relations between countries can be better understood within 
the context of globalisation, which has favoured the integration of economies of 
different countries around the world through international trade and financial flows 
(IMF, 2008). The growing links between economies, states and societies has been 
possible thanks to the increasing cross-border movement of goods, capital, services, 
technology, information and labor migration. It is a process of global cooperation, 
integration and interaction among actors at long distance mediated through flows of 
people, information and ideas; and according to the KOF Index of Globalisation it can 
be classified into three main dimensions: 1) economic globalisation, characterised as 
long distance flows of capitals, goods, services; 2) political globalisation, characterised 
by the diffusion of government policies; 3) social globalisation, characterised as the 
movement of people as well as of ideas, images, and information
82
. Throughout the 
years, German-Russian relations have covered all dimensions, but one is particularly 
relevant to determine the extent of their strategic relationship. 
The economic globalisation is defined by the IMF as an historical process, and the 
result of human innovation and technological progress. According to the Global 
Economy, economic globalisation consists of two dimensions: “actual economic flows 
and restrictions to trade and capital.”83 Since the end of the Second World War, 
Germany adopted a free economic market, increasing opportunities for exports and 
trade investment, and creating an international industrial and financial structure. As 
Chivvis and Rid observe, German businesses have always sought new markets to 
maintain high wages through exports of high quality, value added industrial goods and 
expertise, which characterised Germany’s economic strategy during the Cold War 
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through the implementation of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
process and the European integration, and later in the post Cold War period through the 
European enlargement towards central and Eastern Europe
84
.  
In the post-war period, the economic factor became increasingly important in 
international relations, thus showing that politics and economics were intertwined and 
that it was not possible to keep separate the concepts of domestic and international, state 
and market. The economist Michael Veseth argues that political actions affects 
international trade and monetary flows, which in turn affect the environment in which 
political and economic decisions are taken. In this context, the International Political 
Economy (IPE) is developed as a social science field of study with the aim to analyse 
the “continuing breakdown of disciplinary boundaries between economics and 
politics”85. Many scholars examined the interaction of domestic and international 
factors as they affect economic policies and outcomes, and have influence on foreign 
policy decisions. The important aspect, as noted Wilson, is that foreign policy is 
increasingly driven by commercial consideration due to the fact that “economic strength 
gives incomparably more political influence than military strength.
86”. Hence, as 
became evident in the globalisation era, economics and politics are connected to each 
other in a strong relationship where many economic issues are often seen through the 
political lens, and economic performances are considered one of the key political forces. 
 
With the rise of globalisation, many countries have opened up their economies to 
foster bilateral trade. In the case of German-Russian relations, the growth of Russian 
economy represented a new and important market opportunity for German exports. 
According to the Bundesagentur für Außenwirtschaft (BFAI), Germany is the third 
largest exporter to Russia in the world and the biggest customer of Russian natural gas 
flow among Western countries. As a proof of what has been mentioned previously, their 
successful trade relations have been politically beneficial resulting in a mutually 
strategic relationship between politics and economics. A concrete result has been the 
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establishment of the Modernisation Partnership in 2008, within which the economic 
cooperation has been used as a tool for Russian modernisation and diversification of its 
economy. The project was supported by German business community, whose interests 
influence the country’s Russia policy considerably, and contribute to strengthen the 
existing networks between German and Russian companies and institutions. What 
Meister argues is that “informal ties between Russia and Germany run across the 
economy”, in a sense that economic interests encourage German industry to lobby for 
good relations, both economic and political, with the Russian partner.  
 
Liberalism 
 Liberal theory conceives states as embedded in domestic and international civil 
society, and considers the individual preferences as the main criteria on which foreign 
policy is based. According to the liberal approach, the fundamental actors in world 
politics are individuals and privately-constituted groups with autonomous preferences, 
whereas governments are a subset of domestic social actors, and the policies pursued by 
states serve primarily the interests of dominant groups. Overall, “interstate behaviour is 
shaped by the pattern of state preferences, not state power”87.  
 Drawing from Moravcsik’s study, liberals contemplate society as a group of humans 
with individual interests, who seek to achieve their social goals by interacting with 
others and creating private organisations. The resulting pluralist society is characterised 
by distinctive patterns of social interests that create different sets of constrains and 
opportunities, and this ‘conflict of positive values’, according to Mill and de 
Tocqueville, is what makes the society liberal. To better explain the liberal view of 
society, three implications of Moravcsik are here reported: 1) the most fundamental 
determinant of politics is the society, thus assuming that the state itself depends on the 
nature of individual preferences in relation to the international system; 2) social order 
and progress is possible only through institutions that combine private motivations with 
social goals of wealth and security; 3) the conflict of interests does not prevent political 
and socio-economic development in terms of wealth and security. 
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 One of the Liberal assumptions relevant to the case of German-Russian relations is 
that the behaviour of states, including levels of international conflict and cooperation, 
reflects the nature and configuration of state preferences
88
. Theoretically criticised by 
realists who claim that power politics prevents states from realising their preferences, 
this assumption has to be grounded in the two-stage model, according to which 
“individual states first define their preferences and then engage in a process of interstate 
strategic interaction to reach a common outcome”89. Therefore, focusing on domestic 
preference formation, always referring to Moravcsik, liberals argue that change in 
foreign policy behaviour and international diplomacy is mainly determined by the 
change in states’ purposes, which are related to domestic and international civil 
societies. The liberal theory, according to the realist Waltz, explains the nature and 
outcomes of interstate relations and how they interact with each other, thus defining 
states’ foreign policy as the result of convergence and divergence of state preferences. 
In Moravcsik’s view, states are formed by individual and group interests, who project 
their preferences into the international system through a particular kind of government. 
 In the contemporary international system, nation states are not the only actors that 
execute foreign policy, although they remain the main players. Other participants are 
intergovernmental organisations such as the European Union, and non-governmental 
organisations. Influence on international cooperation, and to some extent on foreign 
policy choices, is exerted also by private actors, non-state transnational bodies and 
multinational corporations, hence transforming the world political system based on the 
Westphalian principles, where states were the only actors. Within this new framework, 
the school of neo-liberalism was developed by the theorists Keohane and Nye, who 
highlight the increasing connections between states, in which the force of power was 
less effective in implementing policy. Emphasising the role of non-state actors and the 
increasing diversities of interactions between nations, the theorists propose the concept 
of transnational relations. In their introduction to Transnational Relations and World 
Politics, the authors claim that “transnational interactions of all types may promote 
attitude change which may have possible consequences for state policy”90. The active 
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involvement of actors in international affairs, according to the neo-liberal theory, has 
several effects, such as the creation of dependence and interdependence. 
 However, interstate’s behaviours are not only shaped by domestic, individual 
interests as it was during the chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder, when the dominant 
groups in politics and economic lobby had a major impact in determining foreign policy 
directions. Norms, identities and values need to be taken into consideration as well, 
when it comes to foreign policy, because they can highly influence actors’ perceptions.  
 
Constructivism  
The theory of Constructivism involves social realities, identities and interactions. It 
seeks to interpret reality, to explain the role of agents in the constitution of social reality 
and it bridges social identities with national interests, and with political practices in 
general
91
. Medvedev and Neumann define Constructivism as the approach that provides 
an understanding of “how relations of powers are constructed in the process of social 
interaction between groups and individuals with regard to basic values, norms and 
identities”92.  
Constructivists acknowledge the importance of both material and normative factors 
in the international system and highlight the connection between agents and structures
93
 
by focusing on the social context in which interstate relations occur. Constructivism 
believes in the social construction of world politics through a process of interactions 
between agents and structures
94
, identities and practices. Identities and preferences of 
international actors, according to the constructivist theory, are shaped by social 
structures which are not fixed
95
, but change with the international context. Taking into 
account that norms, according to Adler, constitute social identities and form the national 
interests, while identities represent the core of national interests and therefore are 
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essential to understand states’ behaviour, practices and change96, constructivists 
emphasise “the role of social norms and identities in constructing international politics 
and determining foreign policy”97. Furthermore, they focus on social discourses that 
construct social realities in order to explain changes and conditions for change.  
The constructivist approach, in this study, helps to understand the political cultural 
factors that shape foreign policy, specifically the socio-cultural domestic context which 
assumes high relevance when it comes to norms’ and values’ violation. Both 
constructivists and foreign policy analysts focus on the impact of agents, state or non 
state-actors, influence and orientate foreign policy decisions. Constructivist scholars of 
foreign policy analysis, as reported by Behravesh quoting Jeffrey Checkel, adopt a 
communicative approach by using “communicatively rational agents”, which means that 
they prefer to use normative tools such as dialogue in social interactions
98
.  
 Within this theoretical framework, it emerges the concept of civilian power, which 
role is based on the normative notion that international relations may be transformed 
and civilised, and on the constructivist notion that values and norms remain stable, 
while interests and behaviours may change
99
. As argued by Harnisch, the constructivist 
approach, by providing an understanding of foreign policy as formed by the mutual 
constitutive relations between agents and structures, is the theoretical dimension of 
civilian powers, which “actively promote the ‘civilising’ of international relations”100.  
 The concept of civilian power is connected to post-1989 Germany’s foreign policy, 
which has been characterised by the use of multilateral institutions and economic 
cooperation, avoiding the use of military force. In accordance to the constructivist view, 
power and material interests, in German foreign policy, have been perceived through the 
lenses of norms and values and “embodied in the civilian power role” (Harnisch, 2010). 
More emphasis on shared informal values, norms and international rules has been 
placed by Angela Merkel, who stressed the importance of multilateralism and the 
necessity to cooperate with other nations to pursue international objectives.  
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Foreign Policy Change and Continuity  
“The question of change and stability in foreign policy is vital for peace and 
security” wrote Kjell Goldmann in the introduction of Change and Stability in Foreign 
Policy: The Problems and Possibilities of Dètente. Having considered that the 
environment in which international relations take place changes, it comes as a 
consequence that foreign policy formation changes as well. Overall, it is possible to 
classify foreign policy changes into two major groups: changes that resulted from 
regime change or state transformation, and changes that resulted from a government’s 
shift of foreign policy directions. Specifically, Charles Hermann identifies four levels of 
foreign policy changes: 1) adjustment change, which occurs at the level of efforts to 
achieve goals or widens the scope of recipients or targets; 2) program change, which 
refers to the change of methods and means by which goals are achieved; 3) problem or 
goal change, which occurs when the overall policy goal is replaced; 4) international 
orientation change, which involves the redirection of the nation’s orientation, its 
international role and actions (Hermann, 1990). Furthermore, Hermann distinguishes 
four agents which contribute to explaining the aforementioned degrees of change. These 
sources are: 1) leadership driven, which results from an authoritative policy maker’s 
decision; 2) bureaucratic advocacy, which refers to the presence of group within the 
government that advocates redirection; 3) domestic restructuring, which refers to the 
society as an agent of change; 4) external shock, which results from a dramatic 
international event. The theorist assumes a likely interplay between the sources, thus 
creating major forces for foreign policy redirection
101
. Foreign policy change, according 
to Goldmann, is mostly influenced by the internal framework: domestic politics highly 
contributes to the change in foreign policy, assuming that conditions for stability and 
instability can be found in environmental changes, negative feedback and shifts in the 
leadership
102
.  
 
Observing the foreign policy of a country over long periods, it is not unusual to 
distinguish some basic long-term policy goals pursued by that country, which do not 
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undergo major changes. Koni explains that one of the reasons for continuity in foreign 
policy lies in the consistency of policy goals, which consistency is the expression of 
societal values that are not challenged by policy-makers
103
. Continuity is mainly 
associated with the “adherence to the value-based expectations of appropriate behaviour 
shared within the international and domestic society” (Rittberger, 2001). In the case of 
Germany, in particular, it is relevant the role-model of civilian power to explain German 
foreign policy continuity, because its set of beliefs is conceived as the stable feature 
driving Germany’s external behaviour after 1989 (Harnisch and Maull, 2001).  
Helmann defines the constructivist approach as the advocate of continuity, as social 
norms, political culture, national identity and social role are “remarkable stable and 
almost resistant to any change”104. Therefore, when it comes to the evolution of foreign 
policies, theorists such as Harnisch and Maull acknowledge a modified continuity rather 
than fundamental changes. In this view, continuity relates to policies of active 
integration and broad cooperation within the international context, thus referring to the 
role of civilian power, among which objectives there is the intensification of multilateral 
cooperation with inclusive participation
105
.  
The civilian power ‘value-oriented foreign policy’ does not account for change, 
rather it promotes a continuous support for human rights, social equity and non-violent 
forms of conflict management; support for strengthening the international law, norms 
and regimes through cooperation, integration and transfer of sovereignty; thus aiming at 
‘civilising’ international relations between states106. The stability of socially constructed 
foreign policy culture is one of the features characterising states’ behaviour in the 
international context, which stability can be understood within the framework of the 
civilian power model, and can explain the reasons of states’ choices to pursue 
diplomatic dialogue rather than militarily intervention to resolve international crisis.  
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Chapter 2. METHODOLOGY 
 
Process-Tracing Method 
The methodology tool used in this work is process-tracing (PT), a qualitative 
method of political science defined as “the systematic examination of diagnostic 
evidence selected and analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by 
the investigator” (Collier, 2011).  
Process-tracing focuses on studying causal mechanism using in-depth single case 
study; this method allows the analysis of causal mechanism linking causes with 
outcomes, thus enabling the researcher to make strong within-case inferences about how 
causes produce outcomes. Using the words of Professor Van Evera, process-tracing 
involves research in which “the cause-effect link that connects independent variable and 
outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps; then the investigator looks for 
evidence of each step” (Van Evera, 1997). In other words, by using PT, the researcher 
examines the correlation between X (cause) and Y (effect), analysing how X creates a 
series of conditions that come together to produce Y.  
Tracing causal mechanisms provides strong evidence-based deductions about causal 
correlations between causes and outcomes, thanks to the in-depth analysis that produces 
within-case evidence of each step of causal process, and provides also a better 
understanding of how a cause produces a certain outcome. 
  
 This approach was firstly developed in 1979 by Alexander L. George, who used the 
term to describe the process of inferring about causal explanations from within a 
historical case study by using evidence
107
. The approach was then developed as an 
essential form of analysis by George and Bennett in Case Studies and Theory 
Development in Social Sciences (2005). In the chapter dedicated to PT, the authors 
define the main objective of this method by asserting that “process-tracing attempts to 
identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – 
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between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable”108. 
Through the method of PT, it is possible to make causal inferences in single cases, 
meaning to observe whether the causal process hypothesised by a theory is in fact 
evident in the given case. Tracing the process that may cause a particular outcome, they 
argue, helps to narrow the list of potential causes. Therefore, it is arguable that process-
tracing becomes an helpful tool in theory testing and theory development as it generates 
numerous observations within a case that need to be linked to each other to constitute an 
explanation of the case
109
. 
  
 By arguing that PT studies the theoretical causal mechanisms linking causes and 
outcomes together, the focus is shifted from causes and outcomes to the hypothesised 
causal process in-between them. The mechanism then, despite there is still a 
considerable disagreement about what mechanisms are, is the causal process, which is 
triggered by causes, that links causes with outcomes and that needs to be unpacked. 
Derek Beach gathered several definitions of causal mechanisms, such as that of Glennan 
who defines it as a system of interlocking parts that transmits causal forces from X to Y 
(Glennan, 1996), and the definition provided by Hernes who describes the causal 
mechanism as a “set of interacting parts – an assembly of elements producing an effect 
not inherent in any one of them” (Hernes, 1998). Beach and Pedersen’s interpretation110 
of causal mechanism in process tracing concerns the analogy of the ‘black box’ between 
X and Y. PT method opens up the black box and reveal the inside causal mechanism, 
which is understood as the process that causes X to give rise to Y.  
 In this view of causal mechanism, as illustrated in figure 1, each of its part is 
described as individually necessary and composed of entities that engage in activities 
which are conceptualised as the “producers of change or what transmits causal forces 
through causal mechanism”111. The entities (actors, organisations, systems) are defined 
as nouns, while the activities (protesting, researching) are depicted as verbs.  
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 Figure 1. – Simple template of causal mechanism (Beach, 2012) 
 
 Through the process of unpacking the causal mechanism, contextual conditions and 
causal logic are made explicit, which contributes to verify and test the initial theory or 
to provide a better theory and evidence of the process. Hence, process tracing can be 
used either for testing theories or in theory-building (or theory development). In both 
cases, the core components of PT are three: 1) theorisation about causal mechanisms 
that link causes and outcomes; 2) analysis of observable empirical manifestations; 3) 
collection of evidence.  
 
 While George and Bennett acknowledge the existence of two different approaches 
within the general method of PT, distinguishing between what they call “process 
verification” and “process induction”, Beach and Pedersen identify three variants of PT.  
According to George and Bennett, “process verification involves testing whether 
the observed processes among variables in a case match those predicted by previously 
designated theories”112, and “process induction involves the inductive observation of 
apparent causal mechanisms and heuristic rendering of these mechanisms as potential 
hypotheses for future testing”113. They recognise that various techniques, either 
inductive or deductive, of process tracing can be used for different purposes in different 
phases.  Drawing from these approaches, Beach and Pedersen distinguish three distinct 
PT research purposes, thus identifying three variants. 
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 Theory testing is a deductive method: it deduces a theory from the existing literature 
and tests whether a hypothesised causal mechanism exists in a given case. It mainly 
looks for evidence of a hypothetical causal mechanism linking X and Y and if it worked 
as theorised. This variant is used when there is an already existing correlation between 
X and Y, but it is not clear whether an actual causal mechanism exists. The first step in 
theory testing is to conceptualise a plausible causal mechanism whereby X produces Y 
based on existing theorisation, logical reasoning and explicit contextual conditions. The 
second step is the operationalisation of the causal mechanism in order to find strong 
evidence. It means to develop empirical case-specific predictions about the observable 
manifestations and to gather empirical material by testing whether the causal 
mechanism is present in the given case. The third step consists in collecting and 
analysing empirical evidence that can be used to make causal inferences. This step aims 
at demonstrate that evidence predicted by the theorised mechanism is present or not.
114
  
 Theory building is an inductive method: starting from empirical material, it aims at 
building theoretical explanations of causal mechanism from empirical evidence of a 
particular case, and uses the empirical analysis to induce a possible causal mechanism 
of linkage between X and Y. It mainly looks for general causal mechanism by analysing 
the empirical material. The variant of theory development is used when there is already 
an existing correlation between X and Y, but the mechanism linking the two is unclear 
and there is no previous theory; or when the outcome is clearly visible but the causes 
are unknown.  
 Explaining outcome is the third PT variant identified by Beach and Pedersen, and it 
is an iterative research method which attempts to trace causal mechanism in order to 
produce a comprehensive explanation of a specific historical outcome. It mainly looks 
for a minimally sufficient explanation of the case by deriving explanations of the 
outcome and by using theoretical causal mechanisms in eclectic combinations. It can be 
either deductive or inductive, starting from theory or empirical evidence, therefore 
following either the theory testing path or the theory building path.  
 
 Overall, process-tracing is used to investigate hyphotesised causal process and in the 
case of this study, to understand international behaviour of actors. George and Bennett 
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underline its relevance in generating and analysing data on those events and intervening 
variables that link causes to observed effects. The authors claim that through process-
tracing, the researcher can assess “whether each of the potential causal variables in the 
imperfectly matched cases can, or cannot, be ruled out as having causal significance”115. 
In the case in which one of the independent variables can be excluded through process-
tracing, it exists a strong basis to determine that the remaining variable has causal 
significance.
116
 Moreover, PT offers an alternative tool for producing causal inferences 
to the method of comparison; it can identify alternative causal paths to the same 
outcome in different cases, and different outcomes for the same causal factor, thus 
contributing to the “development of differentiated typological theories”117. 
   
The independent variables in German-Russian relations’ process-tracing 
The advantage of using process-tracing method lies in the “contextualisation of 
qualitative variables” in given cases that account for changes in a specific case118. Since 
the thesis interest is to assess the extent of economic and geopolitical factors in 
determining Germany’s Russia policy, the method of process-tracing is here used to 
investigate the causal mechanism behind the existing evident outcomes of German 
foreign policy. By analysing the evidence, it will be possible to assess whether a major 
change in Germany’s Russia policy has occurred from the Georgian crisis to the 
Ukrainian crisis by a refocus in foreign policy’s priorities. Keeping the main factors 
constant, the study traces the process of German-Russian relations over a specific period 
of time, focusing on each period and on what have changed over time.  
The main factors are the already explained features of ‘economic interest’ and 
‘geopolitical concern’ which relates also to clash between values and interests. They are 
here considered the main influential factors shaping bilateral relations between 
Germany and Russia.  
 
                                                          
115
 Bennett, A. & George, A. L., Process Tracing in Case Study Research, MacArthur Foundation 
Workshop, 1997 
116
 George, A. L. & Bennett, A., Case Study and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2005 
117
 Bennett, A. & George, A. L., Process Tracing in Case Study Research, MacArthur Foundation 
Workshop, 1997 
118
 George, A. L. & Bennett, A., Case Study and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2005 
49 
 
Economic cooperation is measured by the level of trade between the considered 
countries, whose trade, economic and energy relationship is supported legally and 
institutionally. Already before the implementation of the Modernisation Partnership, 
annual meetings, conferences, seminars and forums such as the German-Russian 
Regierungskonsultationen, German-Russian Working Group for Strategic Questions of 
German-Russian Economic and Financial Relations (SAG), provided the framework for 
economic discussions and joint projects
119. The public forum “Petersburg Dialogue” 
was aimed at deepen the mutual understanding between Moscow and Berlin by 
establishing a constructive dialogue in several public areas, and by promoting and 
implementing many projects. It includes high level meeting and economic workgroups 
between the respective business communities. Within the framework of the 
Modernisation Partnership, cooperation in energy efficiency and renewable energy was 
implemented, and it was found the German-Russian Energy Agency (RUDEA), a joint 
venture with ambitious goals which, however, have not been fulfilled. In 2010, the 
Declaration on German-Russian Strategic Partnership on key areas of economic 
cooperation was signed between the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian 
Federation and the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology
120
 with the 
goal of strengthening cooperation in mutual investment, improving the business climate 
and improving the development of cooperation between their business associations. 
Also, both in Berlin and in Moscow are present strong advocates of reciprocal business 
interest such as the Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations (CEEER), 
composed by German business organisations and representing the interests of German 
business in Moscow
121
. 
The factor ‘economic interest’ is crucial, given that Germany is one the main trading 
partner for Russia as well as Russia’s largest market for oil and gas; it is indeed the 
largest European importer of gas. The lack of raw resources makes Germany dependent 
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to imports, and Russia, being the “world’s largest producer of crude oil and the second-
largest producer of dry natural gas”122, is highly dependent to energy exports. As a 
logical consequence, it followed the establishment of a strategic economic cooperation, 
based on supply and demand, in support of the economic needs of both. The 
construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline has represented the seal of German-
Russian energy integration.  
Change in government coalitions can play the role of intervening variable as having 
an effect on the trend of relations. This has been demonstrated by the German 
experience of the last two chancellorships, the first of which was marked by closeness 
and personal friendship with Moscow, whereas the second one has been characterised 
by skepticism, disappointment and more emphasis on the European core values.  
 
The factor ‘geopolitical concern’ here refers to German misgiving as a reaction to 
geopolitical challenges posed by the Russian Federation to the international context in 
terms of security, norms and values. It follows the geographical conditions that explain 
the power of states and their expansions; according to Michael Klare, “national power in 
XXI century is determined by the vastness of a country’s resources and its ability to 
generate other sources of wealth to purchase resource, especially oil”123. Taking into 
consideration the increasing aggressive attitude of Moscow, which does not hesitate to 
use energy as a tool to threaten and manipulate other countries, its geopolitical power 
has been revealed in different circumstances, and it seems that Germany can no longer 
tolerate it, especially if considered its weight in the EU.  
Since 2011, after the announcement of Putin’s return to the Kremlin, a bitter 
disappointment arose within the German government as demonstrated by the frequent 
criticism of Angela Merkel to Putin’s attempt to keep its neighbours distant from the 
European Union, to Russian banning of nongovernmental organisation, to the spread 
corruption and to violation of human rights. Germany’s strong commitment to universal 
values and rights was more than ever emphasised by its critical stance towards the case 
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of Pussy Riot trial for hooliganism, the ban on homosexual propaganda and anti-gay 
legislation, and the arrest of Greenpeace activists in the Arctic. The image of Russia 
among German public opinion
124
 has deteriorated over time, reaching its lowest point 
with the annexation of Crimea, when the repeated Russia’s adherence to European 
values
125
  has been disproved. The violation of international law came as part of more 
general geopolitical considerations which include norms, values, national interests and 
geopolitical spaces.  
The  importance of geography and space is crucial in international relations, and 
geopolitical arguments are at the core of countries’ formulation of foreign policy in 
pursuing national interests. The construction of geopolitical space is a central matter in 
foreign policy discourses of Russia, whose main goal is to establish itself as a strong, 
powerful and influential country in the international system
126
. Svarin recognises three 
principal geopolitical spaces in Russia’s foreign policy: Eurasia, the Euro-Atlantic 
region (EAR) and the Asia-Pacific region (APR); he also observes a gradual shift from 
the Euro-Atlantic region to the East
127
, intensified by the increasing negative perception 
of the EU and NATO enlargement. The geopolitical logic of the Ukrainian crisis 
involves both, the EU and NATO: on the one side, the NATO membership promised to 
countries of the former Soviet space (Ukraine and Georgia, Bucharest Summit 2008
128
) 
and on the other side, the wider European agenda of the EU enlargement clashing with 
Russia’s idea of a “Greater Europe”. From the Russian point of view, the threat posed 
by the West was enough to push Moscow to occupy the Georgian territory first, and 
later Ukraine.  
By using the method of process-tracing, geopolitics as independent variable can 
reveal causal mechanisms, demonstrating the importance role of geographical 
conditions, which in turn can explain certain general patterns and long-term processes. 
Geographical conditions are therefore determinant for explanations of some current 
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major events in international relations, but as noted by Scholvin, geopolitical factors 
always need to be combined with non-geographical factors to better explain the 
observed outcomes
129
. 
 
As evident, the two factors are interrelated. Gazprom has become an essential tool in 
the hand of the Russian government to exert influence within the international scenario, 
by using hydrocarbons to put pressure on the relations with Russia’s neighbours 
(Cohen, 2011). In 2008, Rubanov stated that Russian energy projects about the 
construction of new pipelines are strongly affected by geopolitics, thus heading towards 
the control of the former Soviet space
130
. In 2014, during the Ukrainian crisis, the 
energy card has been played again by Russia, which used the threat to turn off the gas 
supply to Ukraine, causing fear of a potential fuel shortage across Europe.  The energy 
variable acquires great importance when it comes to interstate relations, especially if 
they involve the Russian Federation, and demonstrates that fossil fuels are often the 
drivers of state power relations.  
 
Both factors, economic interest and geopolitical concern, are assessed by collecting 
material evidence in form of statements, speeches and press releases from the German 
Government and Federal Ministries to evaluate German concern towards Russia’s 
actions, and bilateral trade data in order to measure the level of economic engagement. 
In the following chapter, which is dedicated to the analysis of the single cases, the 
evaluation of the two factors’ weight is carried out through the examination of evidence 
in two different circumstances for each case: before and after the development of focal 
events. The official statements are taken as a parameter in the analysis, since they 
clearly express the direction of German foreign policy toward Russia in specific 
moments, while economic data are a tangible proof of what have or have not changed in 
their economic trend throughout the years. Therefore, it will be possible to assess the 
tendency of change or continuity in Germany’s Russia policy for each single case and 
also to assess the general trend of their relations, trying to better understand which 
factor plays a major role in its Russia policy. 
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Timeline and sources of German-Russian relations’ process-tracing 
The collection of empirical evidence, including bilateral agreements, share of total 
imports and exports, macroeconomic indicators, top- and high-level meetings as well as 
diplomatic working contacts, is carried out in relation to the historical and political 
context. The official statements of the Bundestag, the Bundeskanzleramt and press 
releases of the Federal Foreign Office, offer a valid source for the collection of 
statements and protocols providing information about German foreign policy directions. 
The three mentioned actors are the main stakeholders in governmental decision-making 
in German foreign policy. However, an important role in influencing foreign policy is 
played even by non governmental agencies: German public opinion and special interest 
groups such as the Ost-Ausschuss, one of the dominant actor in Berlin’s Russia 
policy
131
. The goal of collecting such empirical material allows the research to trace the 
development of bilateral relations between Germany and Russia in the time period of 
2005 until 2014, and to assess whether, why and to what extent foreign policy has 
changed.  
The choice of the time period lies in the specific intention to trace the evolution of 
Germany’s Russia policy from ‘change through rapprochement’ to ‘change through 
interweaving’, until the current and so-called ‘Frostpolitik’. The major events of this 
period that have involved Germany and Russia, either as main actors or as observers, 
and that have had a huge impact at the international level are the signature of the Nord 
Stream gas pipeline (2005), the conflict in Georgia (2008) and the crisis in Ukraine 
(2014). By using process tracing, these three major events are investigated in the light 
of the two independent variables and thus, complex interaction effects in German-
Russian relations are identified. After the operationalisation, it is outlined which of the 
independent variables accounts for having causal significance in each of the mentioned 
case and if, as expected, the higher relevance of one independent variable accounts for 
the lower relevance of the other. 
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Chapter 3. GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY TRACING 
In this chapter, initially an overview of German foreign policy will be provided with 
primary focus on its key principles and core ideas. The balance between German 
economic interest and the importance of rights and values is at the core of Berlin’s 
foreign policy, and it represents the key issue of this thesis in analysing German-
Russian relations. To follow, Germany’s Russia policy will be outlined with particular 
reference to the changes in government coalitions and successively, the track of the key 
defining moments will provide the framework for the process-tracing analysis of 
German foreign policy’s direction towards Russia. The empirical measurement of 
balance between economic and geopolitical considerations in German foreign policy 
will be carried out on the basis of bilateral relationship’s development and taking into 
account the official statements of German Federal Foreign Office and Government.  
 
German Foreign Policy 
After the German reunification in 1990, the sovereign Federal Republic of Germany 
regained political and economic power, adopting a set of distinctive characteristics of 
the former West Germany’s foreign policy. Multilateralism became the core idea of its 
foreign policy and the concept of ‘civilian power’ determined Germany’s foreign and 
security policy
132
.  
Multilateralism, which is defined by Robert Keohane as “the practice of 
coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states”133, was adopted to 
ensure West Germany’s foreign policy objectives such as the peaceful resolution of 
national division, the prevention of nuclear wars and the defence of territorial integrity, 
reasons why Germany engaged in the multilateral institutions of NATO and the 
European Union. Focusing on European integration, as Crawford states, Germany based 
its foreign policy and international behaviour on civilian practices emphasising the 
supremacy of international law and norms, collective and cooperative security and trade 
cooperation. The multilateral approach helped the country to enhance state power and 
regain international acceptance and influence. Today, Germany relies on multilateralism 
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in a different way in respect to the Cold War period, it supports the multilateral 
approach to enhance its state power without having to rely on power politics (Reimer, 
2015). Through the EU, “Germany has been able to become a regional hegemon, and to 
provide stability to the continent”134, thus making the European integration and 
multilateralism the main pillars of its foreign policy
135
.  
German foreign policy role of ‘civilian power’ is described by Hanns W. Maull as 
being “committed to deepening European and transatlantic integration, enhancing 
cooperative and multilateral conflict resolution, and resorting to force only within the 
framework of the United Nations”136. According to the author, the concept of civilian 
power is the main aspect of German foreign policy, which aims to ‘civilise’ 
international relations through the promotion and internationalisation of socially 
accepted norms
137
. Germany as a ‘civilian power’ relies on multilateral institutions and 
economic cooperation to accomplish its aims, without the use of military force. Its role 
is based on a ‘value oriented’ policy which emphasises support for human rights, 
democracy assistance, dialogues, incentives and long-term strategies of political 
influence
138
. As argued by Maull, reunited Germany has followed a path of continuity in 
exerting foreign policy with the concept of civilian power as the basis for its strategic 
culture
139; in 2014 he argued that “Germany’s value-based foreign policy has in the past 
proven to be an important foreign-policy asset, and there is no indication of this 
changing in the near future”140. 
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German foreign policy is based on the normative foundation of its Basic Law
141
, 
according to which the federal government is committed to protect basic rights (Article 
23), to ensure peaceful relations between nations (Article 26) and to transfer sovereign 
power to international organisations (Article 24), pursuing a multilateral approach, 
which aims to shape and “civilise international relations through a binding framework 
of law and regulations” (Maull, 2014). In that respect, the Federal Foreign Office 
declares that “Germany’s foreign policy is value-oriented and interest-led. Its foreign 
policy agenda revolves around Europe, the transatlantic partnership, working for peace, 
new players and managing globalisation”142.  
 
However, German support for multilateral approach also serves the material 
interests of its export-oriented nature. The country benefits economically, as well as 
geopolitically, from the integration of new candidates into multilateral Western 
institutions, and German approach of democracy promotion “responds to economic 
considerations related to German trade and investment” (Wolff, 2013). The federal 
country is a big beneficiary of the free global market, its economic development in a 
globalised era has made Germany’s economy increasingly dependent on exports, and 
thus determining the economic nature of its foreign policy goals. In this sense, Germany 
can now be best described as a “geo-economic power” meaning that it uses the “method 
of commerce” as the main tool in international relations, or in Edward Luttwak’s words, 
the main tool in the “logic of conflict” rather than military methods143. The use of 
economic power rather than military power for its influence is what defines the 
paradigm of geo-economics and also, according to the geo-economic view, German 
foreign policy directions. The relationship between state and business is determinant for 
a geo-economic power, and undeniably over the last decade in Germany, business has 
exerted increasingly significance influence on foreign policy.  
Szabo describes geo-economics as a form of realism, which gives priority to the 
national economic interest over other political or social considerations, thus defining it 
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as the ultimate goal of states’ foreign policy144. As recognised by Luttwak, the XX 
century has been characterised by the shift from geopolitics to geo-economics in the 
system of international relations and this aspect of foreign policy, according to Szabo, 
will only increase in future. The author depicts the model of German geo-economic 
foreign policy as mainly characterised by economic interest which prevail over human 
rights, democracy promotion and other non-economic interests, and as a foreign policy 
that uses economic power to coerce other states and relies on a selective 
multilateralism
145
. The opposition of German chancellor Schöder, in 2002, to the US 
plan for invading Iraq and the 2011 abstention from the United Nations Security 
Council vote on the Lybia resolution driven by Westerwelle are example of the 
‘German way’ or Sonderweg, and also an evident estrangement with the traditional 
multilateral approach. Hans Kundnani, who strongly believes that Germany is less 
constraint than it used to be and does not need multilateral institutions as happened in 
the past
146
, argues that Berlin uses multilateral approaches when it considers necessary, 
and acts bilaterally when it does not. In the light of this, it seems that Germany’s 
Westbindung has been weakened since its implementation under the West German 
chancellor Konrad Adenauer.  
 
The concept of Westbindung, already expounded in the historical chapter, refers to 
German integration into the European framework and into the military structure of the 
Western institutions. NATO membership was highly symbolic as it stood for 
Germany’s decision to turn Westwards, more precisely towards the United States, thus 
sealing the German-American cooperation. Western integration has been at the basis of 
German foreign and security policy, and its attachment to Western institutions has 
reflected Germany’s values and interests (Bozo, 2017).  
The primacy of Western ties is counter-balanced by Germany’s engagement with its 
Eastern neighbours, in particular with Russia. Ostpolitik, indeed, is one of the key tenets 
of German foreign policy, together with transatlanticism, European integration, 
multilateralism, respect for human rights and democracy promotion and rejection of 
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war
147
. Initially developed by Willy Brandt to improve relations with the East, and 
revisited few times throughout the years, the policy of Ostpolitik has represented 
Germany’s cooperative approach towards Russia until present. 
Both foreign policy approaches, Westbindung and Ostpolitik, are part of the same 
strategic culture that characterised Germany since the Cold War. As highlighted by 
Szabo, Germany learned from its experiences that dialogue, diplomacy, multilateralism 
and mutual trust are the best approach for dealing with both opponents, the US and 
Russia; and willing to maintain a balancing position between the two, Germany has 
always sought to mediate between East and West by relying on soft power and 
supporting one side without ‘harming’ the other. Example of this multilateral approach 
in past is Kohl’s decision to support NATO enlargement in the 1990s, on the condition 
that Russia would be involved through the NATO-Russia council.
148
  
 
Germany’s Russia policy  
The policy of engagement and cooperation with Moscow known as Ostpolitik was 
based on the idea that economic cooperation would have prompted positive effects on 
Russia’s domestic political and economical developments. The Wandel durch 
Annäherung, or change through rapprochement, became official as the Neue Ostpolitik 
when Brandt became chancellor and the new Eastern policy was considered a necessary 
step for developing a sovereign German foreign policy and expanding its scope
149
. Even 
after the country’s reunification, this policy was used as a tool of foreign policy to 
cooperate with Moscow and improve their strategic understanding. Today, three years 
after the Ukrainian crisis, the word Ostpolitk echoes within the German-Russian 
debates. 
 
German efforts to engage with Moscow further intensified after 1998 under 
Schröder’s administration that placed Russia policy at the top of German foreign 
agenda, given rise to concern about a ‘Russia first policy’ to the detriment of 
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transatlantic ties
150
. Personal contacts with the Russian president contributed to the 
prioritization of the ‘Russia first policy’ and the pursuit of German Sonderweg, which 
became evident with chancellor’s opposition to the US invasion of Iraq, was a clear sign 
of Germany’s inclination towards East.  
The principle of ‘change through rapprochement’ during Schröder’s chancellorship 
was developed into ‘change through economic interlocking’ as the social democrat 
pushed for stronger ties with Moscow, declaring that strong economic relations with 
Russia would have led to transformation of Russian societal situation (Kundnani, 2015). 
The personal and economic dimensions added to Ostpolitik by Schröder improved 
political relations and reciprocal understanding between the two countries, and 
responded to the commercial needs of Germany. Great emphasis was placed on the 
economic interests of the German economy in search of new potential markets and 
stable flows of energy supply and therefore, as claimed by Kundnani, the slogan Wandel 
durch Handel, or ‘change through trade’, became a justification for any business as 
usual under almost any circumstances
151
. Despite the internal and external criticism of 
Germany’s Russia policy under Schröder, the chancellor signed a number of bilateral 
agreements of strategic importance with the Kremlin, among which the most relevant 
for the purpose of this work is the signing of the Nord Stream project. 
 
The 2005 change in German government coalition did not profoundly alter the key 
principles of Ostpolitik, which logic continued to be the main approach for cooperation 
with the Russian Federation, rather it only brought more sober and critical tone from the 
side of the new chancellor, Angela Merkel willing to put more emphasis on the human 
rights dimension in German policy and on the interests of Central European NATO 
members. The idea of economic interlocking was maintained during her first term in 
office, and one of the reason for such continuity was the presence of Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier as Foreign Minister. The social democrat Steinmeier occupied the seat of 
vice chancellor during the former chancellorship and was a strong supporter of 
Ostpolitik as well as one of the designer of Schröder’s Russia policy. In 2008, he 
launched the previously mentioned Partnership for Modernisation reflecting the core 
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idea of the new Eastern policy, and the same approach, even though with less emphasis, 
was confirmed also by his successor, Guido Westerwelle. Despite the new Foreign 
Minister was less engaged in Germany’s Russia policy, he emphasised the need for 
close economic networks in order to overcome remaining divisions (Szabo, 2015). By 
advocating the policy of ‘change through trade’152, the new German coalition proved to 
be willing to support Russian efforts towards modernisation and thus, to promote 
German economic interest, but mainly focusing on human rights situation, democracy 
promotion and on strengthening the rule of law. As Medvedev was elected president in 
2008, German chancellor intensified her relations with the new Kremlin’s 
administration in light of Medvedev’s commitment to modernise and democratise his 
country. The Christian Democratic-Liberal government (2009-2013) indeed continued 
to support the economic cooperation, despite a ‘Russia first policy’ did not constitute a 
priority for the new German chancellor, during whose coalition the labels ‘special’ and 
‘strategic partnership’ were not used and Russia was only regarded as “an important 
partner for overcoming regional and global challenges”153. The Modernisation 
Partnership did not disappeared but rather, it became a foreign policy tool within the 
framework of the Ostpolitik strategy, used to bridge the values and interests approach 
by relying on the concept of modernisation through interdependence, which “assumes 
that Russia cannot be changed through pressure from the outside but only through 
continual and nonthreatening interaction and interdependence, which will lead to 
change from within”154.   
As demonstrated by Russian negative domestic developments since Putin’s return to 
presidency in 2012, German policy of ‘change through rapprochement’ did not 
produced the expected effects, moreover the Modernisation Partnership resulted in an 
increasing of bilateral misunderstandings between Germany and Russia. According to 
Meister, the two partners had different views on the cooperation as they “were speaking 
about the same topics but had diverging interests and priorities”. If Germany was using 
the economic and energy interdependence to seek political and economic change in 
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Russia, the latter was primarily focused in technology and know-how transfer. The 
return of Putin as president, the lack of progress in human rights situation, of democracy 
and transparency, the growing corruption, and especially the lack of reciprocity on 
Moscow side made the “Germany’s idealistic Russia not compatible with Putin’s 
realpolitik”155, and paved the way for an escalating deterioration of their bilateral 
relations since the Georgian War, thus indicating a plausible shift in German foreign 
policy towards Russia which presumably culminated with the crisis in Ukraine.  
 
Nord Stream and the energy variable 
The energy cooperation between Berlin and Moscow is at the core of their special 
relationship. Germany needs Russian energy as much as Russia needs Germany’s 
market, thus resulting in a logic interdependence. Direct instruments of energy 
cooperation are the pipelines, which assume a strong geopolitical implication already 
starting from the initial phase of their design and once they are constructed, they 
become an influential tool of political pressure in the hand of states.  
The most symbolic energy agreement between Germany and Russia has been that of 
the Nord Stream project for the construction of a gas pipeline that directly connects the 
two countries through the Baltic Sea. Already in 1997, a first draft of a north gas 
pipeline route from Russia to northern Germany was drawn by Russia’s Gazprom and 
its then Finnish partner Neste, but it was only in September 2005 that the North 
European Gas Pipeline project was agreed and approved. In December 2005, the 
construction of the Russian onshore section of the pipeline began, and one year later the 
entire enterprise was renamed Nord Stream. The project was the result of a German-
Russian joint venture, today known as Nord Stream AG, an energy cooperation between 
Gazprom, the German companies E.ON Rurhgas and BASF/Wintershall and the N.V. 
Nederlandse Gasunie, that was greatly welcomed by the German and Russian 
government. Putin and Schröder, in fact, had been both proponents of the project and 
furthermore, former German chancellor Schröder has been the chairman of Nord Stream 
AG since 2006.  
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Composed of two pipeline lines, which construction started in 2010 and entirely 
completed in 2012, Nord Stream is long 1,224 kilometres running from Vyborg to 
Lubmin, and has an annual capacity of 55 billion cubic meter (bcm) with an estimated 
lifetime of 50 years
156
. It allows Russia to supply natural gas directly to Germany while 
bypassing Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and traversing five countries
157
. As 
being the most direct connection between Russian gas reserves and European energy 
market, it symbolises the integrated energy trade between Berlin and Moscow.  
Germany benefits from Nord Stream in different ways: bypassing the Baltics and 
Poland, the pipeline constitutes a new channel for energy import that minimises the 
sovereign risk of cross-border projects, it reduces the cost of transportation, and its 
transport capacity guarantees direct energy supply to the country, meeting a quarter of 
additional import needs of Europe (Nord Stream, 2008). Berlin “needs to import nearly 
90% of the gas it consumes” declared Amelang with reference to 2014 Energy Study 
issued by the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR). 
In 2012, according to International Energy Agency (IEA) data, Germany imported 
85.9% of natural gas, which demand corresponded to 87.2 bcm a year
158
. In 2013, 
Germany consumed 91 bcm of natural gas, 39% of which coming from Russia and 
imported by pipeline
159
.  
 
Having recognised the strategic importance of Nord Stream cooperation for both 
sides, and also taking into consideration that the basic agreement was signed under the 
Schröder’s administration, it becomes unquestionable the primacy of economic interests 
in the then Germany’s Russia policy. One of the major points of Schröder’s Nord 
Stream policy was that the project would bring Russia closer to Europe, and the EU-
Russia relations could certainly benefit from that. Another focal point for supporting the 
joint venture was that the pipeline would secure the increasing demand for natural gas in 
Europe by passing those politically unstable transit countries like Ukraine and Belarus. 
                                                          
156
 "Nord Stream - The New Gas Supply Route for Europe." Nord Stream AG http://www.nord-
stream.com/  
157
 Kornfeld, I., The Marriage of Russian Gas and Germany’s Energy Needs, Journal of Energy and 
Environmental Law, 2012 
158
 Germany Energy Supply Security 2014, 
http://www.iea.org/media/freepublications/security/EnergySupplySecurity2014_Germany.pdf 
159
 Amelang, S., Germany’s dependence on imported fossil fuels,Clean Energy Wire, 2015 
https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/germanys-dependence-imported-fossil-fuels  
63 
 
The Nord Stream project, according to Kramer, was part of a political pattern designed 
by Schröder while he was still in office, in order to secure the primacy of German 
business interests “ahead of all other issues when dealing with Russia”160. The pipeline 
design, indeed, was developed prior to the signing of the basic agreement; in 2005, the 
deal was closed for € 4 billion, € 1 billion of which was personally guaranteed by the 
German chancellor; and few weeks after the social democrat left the German 
chancellery, while Gazprom offered him the position of chairman of Nord Stream AG 
shareholders committee
161
. These events and circumstances have demonstrated that 
politics played a huge role in the planning and preconstruction process of the gas 
pipeline.  
 
The project had been highly criticised by Germany’s and Russia’s neighbours in 
view of environmental, political and energy security concerns. Poland accused Germany 
of doing its own business without considering Eastern European interests and blamed 
Berlin to make Germany and Europe more dependent on Russian supplies
162
. The 
Baltics complained that the project would have denied them transit fees as well as 
threaten Europe, given Russia’s reliability, and repeatedly linked the pipeline venture to 
the World War II events
163
. Sweden was concerned about the offshore platform close to 
its borders which could favour for intelligence and military operations. Overall, the 
main common political concern regarded Germany’s further dependency on Russia, an 
argument which had been addressed by German government by arguing that the 
dependence is not a one-side one but it is a mutual dependence, or an 
interdependence
164. In Whist’s analysis of the political debates around Nord Stream, the 
concept of interdependence is described as a normative argument used in Germany’s 
Nord Stream policy.   
“Interdependence fosters peace” states Whist, who defines the normative aspect of 
interdependence by arguing that “mutually beneficial exchange – trade – creates 
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condition in which conflict becomes less likely because the parties involved gain more 
from the commerce than from any potential hostilities”165. This idea has been at the core 
of Germany’s foreign policy especially in regard to economic and energy relations with 
Russia, recalling the well known Ostpolitik. The idea that Nord Stream project serves 
this purpose was mentioned by foreign minister Steinmeir, who believed that deepening 
energy and trade relations with Moscow meant to ensure good relations, and according 
to this view the undersea pipeline has represented a milestone comparable to the 
European Coal and Steel Community (Sven Hirdman, former Swedish ambassador to 
Russia)
166
.  
Despite the sharp criticism coming from Central and Eastern Europe, in particular 
from the then Polish defence minister who compared Nord Stream to the 1939 Nazi-
Soviet pact by calling it “the Molotov-Ribbentrop pipeline”, the energy-based 
Germany’s Russia policy did not undergo any critical change even when Merkel took 
over the chancellery. During the first meeting with the then Russian president, 
Medvedev, she regarded Nord Stream as “strategically important for the whole Europe”, 
and renewed German government’s support for the project. 
 Whist accounts the reasons for continuity in Germany’s policy towards Moscow in 
spite of the change in German government coalition by adducing Germany’s energy 
dependence on Russian gas, which he considers unlikely to change in the future
167
. The 
energy sector is the key shared interest between Germany and Russia, and Nord Stream 
is the largest project that mutually benefit both countries, reason for which the 
relationship has not changed. A second reason is the presence of a strong energy lobby 
in Germany with interest in doing business in and with the Russian Federation. As 
mentioned several times in this study, pro-Russian business lobby has huge influence on 
Germany’s foreign policy directions, which is something that then new appointed 
chancellor, Angela Merkel, could not ignore.  
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Georgian conflict  
 The first serious challenge faced by Merkel’s foreign policy occurred in 2008 in 
conjunction with the five days war in Caucasus, which shattered relations between 
Germany and Russia and raised disagreements within the EU. 
 
 Prior to the Georgian crisis, Germany’s relations with Russia were characterised by 
high interdependence and high reciprocal engagement. As emerged from 
macroeconomic indicators, the annual growth of German-Russian trade reached the 
peak of 67 billion dollars in 2008
168
, with German imports from Russia accounting for 
26.6 billion dollars, namely 2.6% of country’s total imports in 2008169, whereas the 
value of German exports to Russia reached 42.8 billion dollars (3.1% of its total 
exports)
170
. The role of private actors was crucial above all in the energy sector, where 
“energy companies has to become one of the central instruments of energy policy”171. 
As pointed out by the Foreign Ministry in February 2008 during the speech on 
European Energy and Security Relations
172
, Russia at that time was already become “an 
energy giant”, especially “for Germany and Europe, Russia is one of our leading oil and 
gas suppliers” and “there is no other way to ensure interdependency than on the one 
hand to involve Russia in the ongoing international dialogue on energy security as well 
as the equally important dialogue on climate change.”173 Maintaining stable cooperation 
with Russia was among the main interests of German government in order to guarantee 
the stability order in Europe. In this regard, indeed, Günter Gloser in 2008 declared that 
good relations with the Russian counterpart are a prerogative: “Ohne gute Beziehungen 
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zu Russland können wir unser Ziel eines gesamteuropäischen Raums der Stabilität nicht 
erreichen.”174 
 
 In August 2008, an armed conflict between Russia and Georgia broke out on the 
Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which had been occupied 
by the Russian Federation and subsequently declared themselves independent from 
Georgia. After the brokered ceasefire, their independence have been recognised by 
Russia, referring to the two republics as part of Moscow’s “zone of privileged interests” 
(Cohen & Hamilton, 2011). While seeking international recognition, the new Republics 
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been officially considered by Georgia as sovereign 
Georgian territories under the Russian military occupation.  
 The reasons behind Russian military intervention in Caucasus are multiple and 
mainly related to highly valued strategic and geopolitical objectives, as declared by 
Cohen and Hamilton
175
. First of all, the roots of the ethno-political conflicts in the 
Caucasian region are linked to the Soviet period and to the collapse of communist 
regimes after 1989. For this reason, Professor Charles King from Georgetown 
University, used the expression “the war of the Soviet succession.”176 Both regions, 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, have been the ground for ethnic conflicts and violent 
tensions between the Georgian government and the ethnic groups during the 1990s, 
sometimes evolving also into secessionist wars, which resolutions and ceasefires did not 
prevent small scale violence from happening the following years. At the official level 
there were not contacts, therefore negotiations came to a stalemate and this lack of 
dynamics allowed conflicts to be labeled as frozen. When Saakashvili came to power, 
his intention was to restore Georgia’s control over all the territory. Weakening 
Saakashvili regime was one of Russia’s geopolitical purposes behind the military 
campaign, together with the prevention of NATO enlargement in the region.  
In 2008 in response to the NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration, Russia 
strengthened its ties with the two Georgia’s secessionist regions and the usual low-
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tensions came to a head once again. Georgian armed forces initiated a large-scale 
operation in South Ossetia, but after five days of fighting Russia pushed them back out 
of the region, destroying Georgia’s military infrastructure and Georgian villages of 
South Ossetia. In the meantime, Abkhazia took advantage of the situation to take back 
those parts of its territory that had remained under control of the Georgian government 
since the end of the first conflict. The conflict thus escalated into a full-scale war 
between Georgia and Russia and ended through the mediation of the EU under the 
leadership of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The European brokered ceasefire 
was signed in Tbilisi and Moscow in August 2008. MacFarlane reports that the EU 
deployed a monitoring missions to Georgia with the aim to ensure that no further 
hostilities would come to a head, while Russia recognised the two secessionist regions 
and signed bilateral agreements allowing the establishment of military bases in their 
territories. The Russian Federation assumed control of the Abkhaz and Ossetian borders 
almost without consequences.  
 
The brief Russo-Georgian war proved to Germany, and to the West in general, that 
Russia is a geopolitical power still able to change international borders by force, 
especially if its interests are threatened. Russia achieved its geopolitical goal of 
preventing NATO enlargement to the former Soviet territories, thus undermining their 
relationships with the US. In regard to Europe, Russia’s military intervention “provoked 
an international crisis, triggering various diplomatic reactions from the European states, 
ranging between strong condemnations of Russia (...) and expression of general concern 
with the conflict escalation of even support of Russia”177. By adducing from Mouritzen 
and Wivel’s analysis178, Larsen divides European reactions into three main categories: 
traditional, fervent and ‘doves’. The latter is the approach used by Germany, based on 
the soft strategy of “binding Russia through socialising the country into European 
values” instead of harsh reactions which could have alienated Russia.179 The balanced 
position of Germany was evident already before the outbreak of the war, when minister 
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Steinmeier tried to implement preventive diplomacy by initiating a three-sided 
discussion between Russia, Georgia and Abkhazia. As reported by the Federal Foreign 
Office, on August 8, Steinmeier called on the parties to enter into a dialogue in order to 
avoid further escalation of violence
180. German Foreign Minister’s intent to play a 
constructive role in the crisis has to be understood within the framework of the new 
Ostpolitik that excluded a sharp confrontational rhetoric of condemnation. Indeed, his 
efforts to defuse the conflict in Georgia did not include anything more than bilateral 
talks urging the need for a de-escalation of the violence and the dispatching to Georgia 
of Deputy Director-General responsible for the Caucasus
181
.  
The rejection of sanctions towards Russia was a clear statement made by the 
Foreign Minister Steinmeier who reiterated the importance for German policy of 
Georgia’s territorial integrity, but simultaneously declared that freezing the dialogue 
with the Russian counterpart or suspending the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement would not have led to any conflict resolutions
182
. As a sign of non-
abandoned cooperative approach, chancellor Merkel, who had been more critical 
towards Russia than Steinmeier, met with the then Russian president Dimitry 
Medvedev. During the talk, happened two days after her meeting with Saakashvili, she 
did not refrain from describing Russian actions as disproportionate and unreasonable
183
, 
also asserting that Russian troops should withdraw from central areas in Georgia
184
.  
German government did support the French Presidency in its approach to end the 
hostilities in Caucasus, but it did not prevent criticism toward Germany for not having 
taken clear resolutions. The Franco-German reaction was criticised for being weak and 
cautious (Bowker, 2011), Germany was blamed for not having taken the immediate role 
of mediator and Merkel’s approach was pointed out as “very careful”, although 
understandable, by the German ambassador to Ukraine, Dietmar Stüdemann, who also 
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added that the crisis in Georgia is a lesson for the whole Europe, and that “they 
(Europeans) must become involved from the beginning and not leave it up to the 
regional powers”185. In spite of criticism, acting cautiously and diplomatically while 
avoiding strong statements was considered the proper way to respond to Georgian crisis 
without ignoring Russia’s responsibilities in the conflict, nor undermining bilateral 
relations with the Kremlin. In 2008, Germany’s foreign policy was highly orientated to 
maintain a stable cooperation with Russia, given priority to its economic interests
186
. 
The global economic and financial crisis, the upcoming construction of Nord Stream 
pipeline and the aggressive stance of Russia in 2007 Munich Speech on security in 
Europe had substantial weight in Germany’s foreign policy direction: at that time, 
strong reactions or implementation of sanctions would have risked a further alienation 
of Russia as a strategic partner, which had already displayed feelings of marginalisation. 
Therefore, as Larsen explains “Germany sought to uphold the diplomatic course to 
avoid derailing the Russia-EU/NATO relations into ‘obsolete’ power rivalry for sphere 
of influence and to ensure Russia’s continued binding to Europe.”187 Ultimately, in fact, 
the main ‘punishment’ for Russian military intervention ad recognition of Georgia’s 
breakaway republics was a short suspension of the NATO-Russia Council, whereas 
shortly after the ceasefire implementation, the re-engagement with Russia was pursued 
and negotiations re-launched
188
, thus coming back to business as usual (Adomeit, 2010) 
without any change in foreign policies. Germany, as well as other great powers, were 
not willing to sacrifice their long-term relations with Russia over Georgia, thus 
demonstrating Larsen’s argument that “great power concerts’ perspective offers the best 
understanding of the European pattern towards Russia”. 
 
 Regardless of the widespread concerns emerged out of the events in Gerogia, they 
did not have the same impact on the relations between Germany and Russia, as 
mentioned above. From the point of view of the institutional commitment aimed at 
maintaining cooperative relations between the two countries, the protraction of the 
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Modernisation Partnership and the efforts to collaborate together in the security field by 
cooperating in the disarmament initiative in Pochep
189
 and by signing the Meseberg 
Memorandum in 2010 proved that the German willing and purpose to maintain a stable 
cooperation with Russia have not been profoundly undermined by the Georgian crisis, 
following the path traced in the previous years by the agreement on the Nord Stream 
Pipeline. The economic indicators concerning their imports and exports, indeed, 
confirm this trend, emphasising Russia’s role as indispensable energy partner for 
Germany, as demonstrated by the value of imports coming from Russia between 2009 
and 2011 period, which was on a constant rise (2.0% in 2009, 2.6% in 2011)
190
.  
 
German commitment to European values on the one side, and the adoption of a soft 
reaction towards Russia on the other, are part of the same strategic perspective of that 
Germany’s Sonderweg which combines elements of both civilian and geoeconomic 
power. Larsen uses the expression ‘flexible model’ to describe this potentially 
conflicting German way, which tends towards “acting in great power concert to address 
urgent needs or in the case of Russia even to assume independent role as a pragmatic 
bridge builder”, “as long as it does not mean deviating radically from the original 
European project”.191  
 
Ukraine crisis  
The outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine has been described as “the most severe 
confrontation in relations between Russia and the West since the Cold War” by 
Forsberg, and as a major international crisis on which Germany has taken the lead 
demonstrating the strength of its foreign policy, referring to its use of economic power 
and diplomacy, by Ulrich Speck. 
 
 From the Georgian events to the Ukraine crisis, bilateral relations between the two 
countries enter a period of tensions, powered also by the Russian domestic 
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developments. In 2012 in view of the presidential elections, German Coordinator of 
German-Russian Intersocietal Cooperation, Andreas Schockenhoff, expressed his 
concern about harassment of GOLOS, the Russian independent association for 
protection of voters’ rights: “Free and independent election observation is one of the 
core elements of European and international democratic standards. Russia is obliged to 
uphold these standards by its membership of international organizations such as the 
OSCE and the Council of Europe.”192 In the list of German concerns, respect for 
political rights has been followed by respect of civil and human rights, which has been 
threaten by the implementation of laws against the “spread propaganda promoting male 
and female homosexuality, bisexuality and transgenderism among minors”193. Markus 
Löning, Federal Government Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and 
Humanitarian Aid, declared that “the legislature’s bill contravenes the European 
Convention on Human Rights”194. In October 2012, he expressed again the German 
grave concern by anti-gay legislation and urged “Russian authorities to repeal the laws 
that contravene the Human Rights Convention without delay”195 and emphasised his 
disappointment for the adoption of the high treason law in Russia by stating that “the 
deterioration of the human rights situation in Russia is evident. I am deeply concerned 
that Russia is moving in a direction which we, as democrats, cannot tolerate.”196 
Violations of human rights played a huge role in the deterioration of German-Russian 
relations as for Germany human rights are “universal, inalienable and indivisible”, as 
declared in November 2012 Foreign Minister Westerwelle: “our guiding principle here, 
enshrined in our Basic Law, is that human dignity is inviolable.”197 
 The lack of results from the Modernisation Partnership was also exacerbated by the 
introduction of the “Foreign Agents198” law by the Russian Federation criticised by 
                                                          
192
 Federal Foreign Office, Press Releases, 26.01.2012 http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2012/120126-Ko_RUS_Wahlen.html  
193
 Federal Foreign Office, Press Releases, 09.02.2012 
 http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2012/120209_MRHH_RUS.html 
194
 Ibid. 
195
 Federal Foreign Office, Press Releases, 26.10.2012  
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2012/121026-
MRHHB_Minderheiten.html  
196
 Federal Foreign Office, Press Releases, 31.10.2012 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2012/121031-MRHH_RUS.html 
197
 Federal Foreign Office, Press Releases, 13.11.2012 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2012/121113-BM_MRR.html 
198
 The law requires independent groups and NGOs to register as “foreign agents” if they receive even a 
minimal amount of foreign funds and engage in political activities. 
72 
 
Löning for cutting NGOs off “from their ties to international human rights organisations 
and leaving them isolated”199. Andreas Schockenhoff warned Russia that “the new 
restrictions also put at risk the Modernization Partnerships both Germany and the EU 
have agreed with Russia. For Germany this is particularly the case, given our 
extraordinarily dense network of ties with Russian civil society”200. 
 Nevertheless, ‘cooperation’ and ‘exchange’ with Russia still remained in German 
interests in 2012 as clearly stated by the Minister of State, Cornelia Pieper, at the 
opening of German year in Russia, which slogan was “Germany and Russia – shaping 
the future together”. “We want to expand and strengthen the relations between Germany 
and Russia. The projects, which have been jointly conceived by Russian and German 
partners, place a high value on “cooperation” and “exchange”. Working together on a 
project encourages the partners to get to know each other better and also promotes 
understanding for the other partner’s point of view” declared Pieper201. In the following 
month, Foreign Minister Westerwelle commented Russia’s accession on WTO defining 
it a “key milestone” and declaring that “new perspectives will also open up for German 
companies and German-Russian trade.”202 Emphasis on German-Russian cooperation 
was put by Westerwelle also in 2013, before the escalation of events in Ukraine. In 
April, during the German-Russian NGO conference, he reiterated the importance of 
German-Russian collaboration for European peace and stability on the basis of freedom, 
democracy and rule of law by emphasising the role of economic exchange, which “trade 
volume reached a record of more than 80 billion euros”203 and also agreed with his 
counterpart Lavrov to widen the scope of topics within the Modernisation Partnership as 
a proof of common will to keep the dialogue open. At the 20
th
 anniversary of German-
Russian Forum in May 2013, Westerwelle underlined the importance of Russia as 
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strategic partner for Germany, as they can “help ensure Europe to become a continent 
with close social and economic networks”204 and furthermore, he declared that 
“Germany and Russia are holding an open dialogue in a spirit of partnership”205. On the 
occasion, German Foreign Minister also provided a definition of the already well known 
label ‘special relations’: “What makes German-Russian relations special is what we 
share: our shared history, our shared culture, shared interests and also shared challenges. 
In our world of change, we will only thrive if we maintain close networks. For Germany 
as a major exporter, these networks are especially important.”206 
 
 The escalation of the events started in 2013 with the refusal of Ukrainian President 
Viktor Yanukovych to sign the Association Agreement and the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), thus dropping negotiations with the 
EU. This led to Euromaidan protests that eventually evolved into a revolution and 
resulted in a new interim government installed in Kiev (Hyde-Price, 2015). The pro-
Euro protests on Maidan square in Kiev were calling for the signing of EU association 
agreement and the step down of President Yanukovych, who was heavily supported by 
the Russian Federation. As violence escalated into clashes with riot police, the Weimer 
Triangle, formed by the Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and Poland, flew to Kiev 
to negotiate an agreement, which resulted in the announcement of new presidential 
elections at the end of 2014 and in the ousting of President Yanukovych. Having 
perceived West’s intervention as a violation of its sphere of privileged interests, the 
strong reaction of the Kremlin culminated with the annexation of Crimea, a southern 
region of Ukraine where an armed secessionist movement emerged right after the ouster 
of Yanukovych. Furthermore, Russia has been supporting the armed pro-Russia groups 
in eastern Ukraine that were seeking to create the semi-autonomist regions of Donetsk 
and Lugansk.  
 
Germany’s reaction to the events in Ukraine has followed the multilateral approach 
pushing for a joint Western position by advocating European unitary stance and 
coordinating responses with the United States. German government strongly reacted to 
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Russian aggression of Crimea and its annexation, defining it as an unacceptable 
intervention that violated international law and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in 
which Russia pledged to respect Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty in its existing 
borders
207
. The Berlin-led strategy, as defined by Speck, was to avoid military 
confrontation and bring the conflict to the diplomatic and economic levels
208
.  
The approach of German chancellor relied on diplomacy, in particular to the “power 
of long-term diplomatic efforts”, and ruled out the use of military force to solve the 
crisis, thus opposing the rearmament of Ukraine with NATO military equipment. 
Angela Merkel, initially, used the strategy of diplomatic engagement with Putin through 
regular telephone calls, such as the phone talk on February 23 to agree on preserving 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and the call on February 28, when Putin declared again 
that no Russian troops were active in Crimea
209
; through talks and meetings, as in the 
case of the Weimar triangle, to push for negotiations with Ukrainian and Western 
leaders or in the case of her failed attempt to persuade the Russian President to rescind 
the referendum in Crimea; she was also the lead negotiator in the two Mins ceasefire 
agreements. The primary goal of the diplomatic effort, as pointed out by Ulrich Speck, 
was to “bring Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table” in order to resolve the 
international crisis.  
The German led-diplomatic effort aimed at broker a solution to the Ukrainian crisis 
did not prevent Russia from annexing Crimea and despite the initial reluctance of some 
EU leaders, in July 2014 the so-called tier-three sanctions were agreed and imposed. As 
the chancellor stressed in her speech at the US Chamber of Commerce in Washington, 
“the option of resolving the crisis with Russia by means of dialogue is and remains on 
the table. If however, the situation in Ukraine is further destabilised then Europe, the 
United States and all partners will not hesitate to adopt further sanctions.”210 The 
implementation of the three stages of sanctions, including travel bans, visa restrictions, 
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asset freezes on Russian officials and economic measures, have been highly significant, 
because it proved to the Kremlin that the European Union was unified by having 
reached an internal common consensus in rejecting Russian aggression to Ukraine, and 
ready to act together also at the cost of undermining national economies.  
 
Contrary to Georgian events of 2008, this time Germany reacted quite immediately. 
Although, it did not have a clear cut policy vis-à-vis Ukraine (Forsberg, 2016), German 
Government supported pro-EU protesters, which had been visited even by Foreign 
Minister Westerwelle, and as soon as the crisis escalated Germany took the role of 
mediator. The reasons for the leading role assumed by Germany in responding to the 
Ukraine crisis have been explained by Hyde-Price, who recognises four main points. 
First, the crisis had a strong international impact and represented a challenge to 
European security; therefore, Germany’s central position in Europe, its growing 
economic and political power in the EU, and its special relations with Russia pushed 
Berlin to play a major role. Second, German interests had been put at stake more than 
any other European interests: the need for stable and open markets is linked to rule of 
law, functioning states and stable geopolitical order in its Eastern neighbourhood. 
Hence, German approach relied on support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and Russia’s 
condemnation, along with diplomatic engagement with Moscow. Third, German 
government strongly believed in the diplomatic solution of the crisis as demonstrated by 
Merkel’s efforts to mediate between Moscow and Kiev such as the proposal of OSCE 
“fact finding” mission211. Also, Steinmeier, returned to the Foreign Office in 2013, 
played an important role in negotiations by advocating peaceful dialogue and brokering 
peace deal between the pro-West opposition and Yanukovych’s supporters212. The final 
explanation regards the security dimension and the role of Bundeswehr. Hyde-Price puts 
the emphasis on the security challenge posed by the Ukraine crisis to Europe, which 
required a constructive multilateral approach. He recognises German approach of 
Ostpolitik as the best strategy in seeking to de-escalate the conflict as it combines 
deterrence with political dialogue.  
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 Germany’s will to firmly react to Russia’s aggressive attitude toward Ukraine was 
already evident in the first speeches released from the Federal Government members in 
the aftermath of the annexation of Crimean peninsula. In 2014, only one year after 
Westerwelle’s speech at the 20th anniversary of German-Russian Forum, the new 
German Foreign Minister Steinmeier held a speech at the meeting of the Forum’s 
Members by using different tones. The meeting took place right after the annexation of 
Crimea and the whole speech was focused at underlining the gravity of events and the 
need to contain the consequences of the breakdown. Although he reiterated the 
importance of German-Russian ties and the Forum’s initiative throughout the years, he 
condemned Russia’s actions by stating that “the attempt to redraw borders seven 
decades after the end of the Second World War is in violation of international law”213, 
and warned that “the political consequences have not yet fully emerged”214 being at the 
stake the very key building bock of foundation of European peace. Steinmeier assessed 
the German foreign policy position by claiming that “ Sunday’s referendum is not in 
line with the Ukrainian constitution, and that the active pursuit of Crimea’s secession 
from Ukraine violates international law.”215 Moreover, he openly declared that Germany 
was ready to risk also its economic and strategic ties with Russia as reported by the 
Federal Foreign Office: “possible reactions may include measures that – although 
harming us – would demonstrate that we cannot accept the continuation of a policy that 
divides and splits up Ukraine, or that seeks to transpose the action taken in Crimea to 
other countries in Eastern Europe. (...) If Russia were to pursue this foreign policy, we 
would support taking strong action, even if this were to bring economic disadvantages 
for us.”216 A week before, German chancellor addressed in a policy statement Russia’s 
actions in Ukraine as a “violation of fundamental principles of international law” also 
adding that “they would not be relativised by other international law violations”. By 
ruling out the military option to defuse the situation, she emphasised the need to adopt 
serious political and economic measures by claiming that “it is vital that we do not 
simply return to business as usual, and indeed we have not done so.”217 Despite stating 
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that none of the 28 EU members was willing to implement a third round on measures as 
this could affect the economic cooperation with Russia, she also openly asserted to be 
“ready and determined to take them if they become unavoidable”218. Bilateral trade data 
on German exports to Russia shows the decrease of the economic factor’s relevance, 
reason why Germany became willing to implement the sanctions. In 2013, Russia 
imported goods from Germany to a total value of 45.5 billion dollars
219
. In 2014, the 
import value from Germany decreased to 37.3 billion dollars
220
, which is 16.9% less 
that the previous year. In 2015, this value felt to 22.4 billion dollars
221
, less than half of 
the import value in 2013. 
 
As evident, the logic of Ostpolitik has continued to play a significant role in 
decision-making, although relations with the Russian Federation have considerably 
cooled. While analysing Germany’s Russia policy during the crisis, it becomes clear 
that the factors shaping its direction have been both external and domestic. Marco Siddi 
provides an explanatory description of their interaction, identifying as external factors 
the hard-line positions towards Russia took by Eastern Europe and the need to act in 
accordance with the transatlantic foreign policy; and as domestic factors the critical 
stance of mass media and public opinions, and the interests of German industries and 
companies that had invested in Russia and were initially skeptical towards the sanction 
regime, even though they eventually became more supportive of Merkel’s policy222.  
A closer look at German domestic scenario is necessary to understand the evolution 
of Ostpolitik, which tenets, as declared by Angela Merkel in 2014, had not changed
223
. 
At first sight, the development of events seems to contradict the chancellor’s statement 
and suggest a general shift of Germany’s Russia policy on the basis of a firm approach 
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toward Russia. Along with Merkel, most politicians took critical stance towards Putin’s 
actions, even Steinmeier, who has been a supporter of Russia’s conciliatory policies, 
could not ignore the interference in Ukraine and despite the initial disagreement on 
sanctions and on the exclusion of Russia from G8, he ended up with favouring the 
sanction regime. Many leaders of both governing coalition’s parties and opposition 
parties held similar positions by publicly criticising the Kremlin’s behaviour, sometimes 
also comparing its actions to those of Nazi Germany (Schäuble, 2014) and supporting 
Merkel’s policy. Alongside politicians, also representatives of German business seemed 
to be inclined to agree upon the government’s line. As Adomeit reports, the director 
general of the Federation of German Industries (BDI), Markus Kerber, agreed to support 
the policy of sanctions and to condemn Russia for its violations of international law by 
arguing that “we adhere to the principle of the primacy of politics”224 as well as Ulrich 
Grillo, president of the BDI, one month before announced to support the policy of 
German chancellor in spite of the worsening of German-Russian relations
225
; and 
Markus Felsner, President of the Eastern Europe Business Association of Germany, 
declared that “most of the enterprises support the sanctions” because what Germany 
business needs is legal framework for investments, not closeness to the Kremlin
226
. 
Forsberg reports that a third of companies operating in Russia withheld their 
investments
227
, thus resulting, according to the Federal Foreign Office, in the decline of 
bilateral trade by 35% in 2015 in respect to 2014 and in the decline of exports by 36%. 
This would suggest that contrary to what Kundnani and Szabo argue, Germany’s 
foreign policy is not determined by national business interests.  
However, as highlighted by Siddi, the principles of Ostpolitik did not disappear in 
both policy making and business communities. Foreign Minister Steinmeier, although 
his alignment with Merkel’s position, has continued to consider the policy of detente 
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and engagement the most influential approach
228
 and publicly sought to accommodate 
with Russia
229
, as he still considered their partnership a long-term goal
230
. Former 
chancellor Schröder, as well as previous chancellors Schmidt and Kohl, has been critical 
toward the government’s line and stressed the need to resume talks with Moscow, thus 
also expressing his disappointment on the expulsion of Russia from the 2014 G8. In an 
interview with a German newspaper, he also expressed his opinion in regard to the EU 
Association Agreement offered to Ukraine by calling it a fundamental mistake of the 
EU who ignored Ukraine’s deep cultural division thus forcing the country to choose 
between East and West
231
. The business communities associated themselves with the 
government’s policy of sanctions, but remained doubtful about their effectiveness and 
especially concerned about their counterproductive effects. The Committee on Eastern 
European Economic Relations (CEEER) in particular expressed its criticism and 
concern for the increasing negative consequences of sanctions on the German economy, 
also urging the chancellery to not implement a tougher US round of sanctions
232
. 
Among the critics of the chancellor’s approach, the voice of Matthias Platzeck, head of 
the German-Russian Forum, was particularly harsh as he declared that Germany should 
endorse Russia’s annexation of Crimea to resolve the Ukraine crisis233 and repeatedly 
criticised the implementation of sanctions. Another example is that of Joe Käser, the 
chief executive of Siemens who met with Vladimir Putin after the annexation of Crimea 
and reiterated the company’s commitment to long-term investments in Russia234, 
arguing that the “short term turbulence” would affect their relationship (Kundnani, 
2015). In addition to the political and business oppositions pushing towards a more 
                                                          
228
 Interview at the Federal Foreign Office of Germany in Siddi, M., German Foreign Policy towards 
Russia in the Aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis: A New Ostpolitik?, Europe-Asia Studies, 68:4, 665-677, 
2016 
229
 Forsberg, T., From Ostpolitik to frostpolitik?, Merkel, Putin and German foreign policy towards 
Russia, International Affairs 92: 1, 2016, pp. 21-42 
230
 Interview at the Federal Foreign Office of Germany in Siddi, M., German Foreign Policy towards 
Russia in the Aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis: A New Ostpolitik?, Europe-Asia Studies, 68:4, 665-677, 
2016 
231
 Ukraine-Konflikt: Schröder macht EU für Krim-Krise mitverantwortlich, Spiegel Online, 9 March 
2014 http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/krim-krise-ex-kanzler-gerhard-schroeder-kritisiert-eu-a-
957728.html 
232
 Karnitsching, M., German BusinessesUrge Halt on Sanctions Against Russia, The Wall Street Journal, 
1 May 2014 https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303948104579535983960826054  
233
 Kirschbaum, E., Senior German Politician under Fire for Plea to recognise Russian Crimea, Reuters, 
19 November 2014 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-germany-platzeck-
idUSKCN0J31PF20141119  
234
 Bryant, C., Siemens CEO meets Putin and commits company to Russia, Financial Times, 26 March 
2014 https://www.ft.com/content/6d774238-b506-11e3-a746-00144feabdc0  
80 
 
cooperative approach to Moscow, in the aftermath of Crimea’s annexation some events 
pointed at further dialogue and re-engagement with Russia: in 2015 Angela Merkel was 
the only Western European leader to participate in the 70° Moscow anniversary of the 
end of the Second World War; like her, also Steinmeier took part in Volgograd 
commemoration events, in which occasion he called for a reconciliation and a 
peacefully resolution of antagonisms and conflicts between Germans and Russians
235
. In 
2015, two other significant meetings seem to indicate German will of keeping the door 
open for political dialogue with Moscow and the reluctance to abandon Ostpolitik. In 
October, Sigmar Gabriel, the leader of the Social Democrats, visited Moscow and met 
with President Putin and Grazprom chief Alexey Miller lamenting the state of German-
Russian relations (Dempsey, 2015) and upholding the energy project cooperation with 
the promise of bringing Nord Stream 2 under Berlin’s legislation (Meister, 2015). In 
November, Miller and Schäfer, Member of E.ON Management Board, met in Saint 
Petersburg resuming cooperation on the new joint  gas transmission project
236
, which 
would double the capacity of the Russian export route to Germany from 55 bcm to 110 
bcm. Although chancellor Angela Merkel defined the project as a purely commercial 
activity of the economic actors involved and that the role of politics would be reduced 
to ensure the fulfillment of legal obligations (Fischer, 2016), she openly supported the 
expansion of the pipeline as well as other officials of the government coalition. 
Moreover, as pointed out by Siddi, the signing of shareholders’ agreement upon Nord 
Stream 2 have sent the political message that German companies are willing to resume 
cooperation with their Russian counterparts in spite of the sanctions.  
Drawing from these occurences, which have been followed by other and more 
current events such as the declared intention of German government in 2016 to ease 
sanctions on Russia and re-engage with Moscow
237, it appears clear the “geo-economic” 
nature of the German Federal Republic, which Russia’s policy is highly driven by 
commercial interests.  
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Assessing the nature of Germany’s foreign policy 
Right after the fall of the Berlin Wall and its reunification, Germany defined its 
interests according to a normative view, within the framework of multilateralism, 
cooperation and civilian norms. It laid as the basis of its foreign policy a set of 
normative values, such as democracy promotion, respect for human rights and reliance 
on supranationalism, thus fitting the “civilian power” model. Since the 2000s, however, 
Germany has slowly moved from the “civilian power” to a “geo-economic power”, by 
prioritising its economic interests over the political ones. It became more willing to 
impose its national economic preferences on other states, it started to rely on a selective 
multilateralism and used its economic strength to increase its diplomatic leverage at the 
international stage.  
This shift in the nature of German foreign policy became apparent during the 
government of Gerhard Schröder, when the national interest was defined in economic 
terms, and later in 2005 when the government coalition was headed by the new 
chancellor Merkel, giving the impression of a return to the “civilian power” model with 
more emphasis on normative values. These structural shifts fall under Hermann’s fourth 
level of foreign policy change, which is linked to the country’s role in the world and to 
a foreign policy’s redirection. However, the regained role of “civilian power” under 
Merkel’s administration was well imbued with a strong economic component, which, as 
previously mentioned, benefited from the new members’ integration in the multilateral 
EU framework. As the German economy grew, so the relationship between the state and 
business intensified, leading to what have been defined by Luttwak as the “reciprocal 
manipulation”238 in which businesses lobby the government’s policies for their interests 
(Kundnani, 2011).   
 
The prevalence of the geo-economic fashion in German foreign policy, in this case 
towards Russia, has been assessed in the analysis of the first two defining moments: the 
Nord Stream project and the Georgian conflict. In the former case, Germany acted 
primarily according to its commercial interests, taking little account of those of Poland 
and the Baltic States, and justifying the energy deal as an efficient alternative to 
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decrease EU’s dependence on Ukraine’s and Belarus’ routes. Despite the German-
Russian project provoked controversy in Europe, sharpened divisions among EU 
members, increased concerns of Eastern Europe and undermined Eastern European 
countries’ interests, Germany signed the agreement anyway, and even managed to ease 
criticism and convinced the Baltics to approve the project. It was a demonstration of 
how politics and economics were becoming increasingly intertwined
239
. In the latter 
case, the conflict in Caucasus was regarded as “the most serious foreign policy crisis to 
date”240 concerning the legitimacy of the use of armed force, violation of territorial 
integrity of another state and violation of international law. Nevertheless, Germany 
demonstrated to be very careful about sanctioning Russia, freezing the then ongoing 
cooperation discussions and doing anything else different from engaging in diplomatic 
political dialogue with the Kremlin. Stable relations with Moscow, at that time, were 
still regarded as a priority especially in the field of energy and security. It is no 
coincidence, indeed, that in the same year Germany initiated the Partnership for 
Modernisation with Russia, in 2010 the Meseberg Initiative
241
 was agreed between the 
chancellor Merkel and President Medvedev, and in 2011 the works for the Nord Stream 
gas pipeline construction began.  
In the case of the Ukraine crisis, it is important to take into consideration the climate 
and the context in which it took place. Since 2012, relations between the two countries 
had started to intensified due to Putin’s return in office, further deteriorating with the 
scandal of Pussy Riot, Russia’s violation of human rights and anti-gay law, and reached 
the lowest point of reliability and mutual trust in 2014. As the conflict broke out, 
Germany took the leadership role in the de-escalation of the conflict, becoming the 
advocate of a common policy towards Russia, implementing sanctions and leading to 
the Minsk agreements. The idea of “change through rapprochement” and the labels 
‘special’ and ‘strategic’ disappeared from Germany’s policy discourse. Russian 
intervention in Ukraine, the escalation of violence in the region and lastly the violation 
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of international law by annexing Crimea were crucial in determining the first German 
foreign policy actions, which accounted for a general shift in Germany’s Russia policy 
towards the tenets of a more value-based “civilian power” model. Merkel talked about 
the need to find new solutions in European energy politics, thus proving to be ready to 
challenge the influence of Russian oil and gas and reduce German dependence on 
Russian energy exports (Meister, 2012), and it has been also acknowledged, as Adomeit 
observes, by the German industry the primacy of politics over economics. At the same 
time, despite sanctions and support for Ukraine, Merkel made it clear that the 
cooperation and communication with Russia were still desirable. 
 
 Economics 
Realpolitik 
Geopolitics  
Moralpolitik  
NORD STREAM - Pro-Russia leadership 
- Economic interlocking with 
Russia 
- Energy dependence 
- Energy security discourse 
- No geopolitical concerns 
- Little account for Eastern 
Europe interests and concerns 
GEORGIAN CONFLICT - Economic cooperation 
- Energy deals 
- EU security issue 
- Modernisation Partnership 
- Violation of international 
law 
- Use of armed force 
- Illegal recognition of 
Abkhazia and Ossetia 
UKRAINE CRISIS - No result from 
Modernisation Partnership 
- Trade without change 
 
 
- Putin’s return to presidency 
- Violation of human rights 
(Pussy - Riot, anti-gay lawa, 
activists) 
- Violation of international 
law (annexation of Crimea) 
Table 1. Economic and geopolitical factors in German foreign policy’s scale in the three cases 
 
As emerges from Table 1., it is necessary to consider both the economic and 
geopolitical landscape in the behavioural analysis of foreign policy decisions taken by 
the German government in the three macro-events which are the subject of this thesis. 
In 2005, the absence of relevant factors in the geopolitical context and the presence of a 
pro-Russia leadership had, understandably, led Germany to initiate a strong cooperation 
with Russia that would meet its domestic economic and energy needs, thus fostering 
their strategic partnership and privileging a ‘Russia first’ policy. In the Ukraine case, on 
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the contrary, the gravity of the occured events is not enough to account for the firm 
reaction of German government; in fact, looking at the wider context contemporary to 
the crisis’ escalation, it is evident how the frayed relations between Germany and 
Russia were already negatively affecting the economic partnership. The German 
discontent for the lack of results of the Modernisation Partnership has contributed to 
reduce their ‘strategic’ relations to the merely satisfaction of German, and European, 
energy needs through the import of gas from Russia, which proved to be an insufficient 
factor to counterbalance the severity of Ukraine events that were shaking the political 
international landscape. Controversial, instead, is the case of the Georgian crisis. To 
evaluate a such different reaction, in comparison to Ukraine, from Berlin vis-à-vis 
similar actions of force taken by Moscow is useful to observe the table, which reveals 
that the reason of dieverging approaches in response to the events has to be found in the 
diverse economic context: the conflict in Georgia occured in a period of cooperation 
necessity, especially in the security and energy sector, with the Russian Federation. It 
was in the German interest, therefore, not to compromise their relationship, even at the 
expense of its role as European mediator and defender of international values.  
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CONCLUSION 
The study conducted over three events of focal importance for German-Russian 
relationship has led to a major consideration: the economic variable represents the factor 
having the most weight in balancing their relations. The results of the analysis reflect 
the initial hypotheses, according to which when the economic ties are strong, it is more 
likely that German foreign policy is aimed at maintaining a stable trend in its relations 
with Moscow, whereas if geopolitical concern prevails over a low economic interest, 
Germany is more inclined to change its attitude towards Russia. Even though the 
geopolitical dimension is fundamental in determining dynamics of states’ relations, the 
case study on the Georgian conflict demonstrates that economic interests can have, and 
indeed had, a major weight in determining Germany’s foreign policy outcomes, 
forasmuch as the geopolitical variable can be ruled out for not having causal 
significance. In fact, keeping the other factors constant, if geopolitical concern had been 
the factor having causal implication, a change in Germany’s Russia policy would have 
been expected also in response to Russia’s aggression of Georgia, as instead happened 
in 2014 after the Ukraine crisis. However, given that in 2008 it did not occurr any 
foreign policy change, the gravity of geopolitical events cannot eventually be accounted 
as the most relevant factor shaping the trend of their relations. This relevance can, 
instead, be attributed to the economic variable, as the analysis reveals that the only case 
in which a major change occurred has been in a context where the economic interest 
was lower than in the other two cases, thus providing a more favourable condition for 
the change.  
Unlike the Nord Stream and Georgian cases, in fact, Germany’s reaction to the 
events in Ukraine cannot account for a general continuity in the foreign policy direction 
of the German country. There has been a structural shift which was evident in the high 
degree of Germany’s engagement in the conflict’s resolution, and in the predominance 
of the geopolitical concern provoked by Russian violation of international law in respect 
to the economic interest. This change, according to Hermann’s classification, can be 
identified as a ‘problem or goal change’, given that the initial goal of German foreign 
policy, namely the constructive cooperation with Russia or the so-called ‘change 
through interlocking and trade’, has been replaced by the new priority of defending the 
international values and the European security order. The change of goal was followed 
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also by the ‘mean’s change’, in the sense that as the constructive trade cooperation was 
not the ultimate goal of Germany’s Russia policy anymore, economic interests lost 
leverage in shaping policy directions in favour of values, thus explaining the imposition 
of sanctions as a punitive tool. At the domestic level, in fact, business did not have the 
major role in shaping Germany’s foreign policy and the “geo-economic” interpretations 
of its Russia policy that suited Schröder’s Ostpolitik fail to assess Merkel’s strong 
response. The former chancellor’s Ostpolitik has been described by Szabo as a policy 
where the national interest is defined in economic terms, multilateralism is used in view 
of the necessities, business defines the national interest, democracy and human rights 
are subordinated to foreign policy objectives, and economic power is exercised to 
impose national preferences
242
.  
 
Over the last years, however, critical voices from the side of the representatives of 
German business lobby have raised, lamenting the long-lasting damage done to German 
economic relations with Russia and the weakened trust between the two partners
243
. The 
abiding effect of German government’s decision of implementing several rounds of 
sanctions was severe on its economic stability. German foreign policy response to the 
crisis has been an attempt to balance between the interest-led Realpolitik and the value-
based Moralpolitik. Germany wrestled to reconcile its civilian values with its economic 
interests, which are two sides of the same coin and reflect the German political division 
between human rights supporters and Russlandversteher
244
. The Russia policy has been 
the subject of serious political debates, and now more than ever it has become clear that 
the foreign policy approach of the “Modernisation Partnership”, driven by economic 
interests and by the idea of cooperation through trade, is in tension with the civilian 
power emphasis on human rights and multilateralism of Moralpolitik. Nevertheless, as 
argued also by supporter of politics over economics like Stefan Meister, Berlin “would 
not entail a reversal of its cooperative approach towards Russia” and still regards the 
engagement with Moscow as a more advisable solution than isolation. Thus, the most 
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likely approach for Berlin is to follow a double path by advocating dialogue with the 
Kremlin, collaborating with Russia on common challenges, while remaining credible 
and reliable to its allies (Westermann, 2016). 
 
As also Szabo pointed out, developments in Ukraine may shift Germany’s policy in 
the short term, but are unlike to fundamentally alter the long-term nature of their 
relationship. Germany did not accept the violation of international law, nor it could 
endorse the annexation of Crimea within the Russian Federation, therefore, by acting as 
facilitator in chief it was also ready to impose tough sanctions being aware of the 
consequences for its economy. Nonetheless, three years after, the crisis in eastern 
Ukraine has settled into a new “frozen conflict” in the post Soviet space and the 
attention has been diverted towards other major international challenges, and today 
German industrials and business representatives have manifested the will to re-engage 
with Russia. The resumed cooperation on Nord Stream 2 project, a new supply route 
across the Baltic Sea and covering 1.200 km for 55 bcm of gas per year, is a 
demonstration that Ostpolitik has not disappered, on the contrary the expansion of the 
gas pipeline can be used as “a lever for the improvement of German-Russian 
relations.”245 In 2015, The German Minister of Economic Affair and Energy asserted 
that Germany and Russia “have to change our relationship”, also adding that sanctions 
cannot last forever
246
.  
This recovery trend, according to which in the next coming years there will likely be 
an economic re-engagement between Germany and Russia, has been supported also by 
the high offices of Germany. On 23 March 2016, Foreign Minister Steinmeier during an 
interview on German-Russian relations declared that despite the unsatisfactory situation 
in Ukraine, the two partners need each other in overcoming challenges and resolving 
conflicts. He referred to the economic situation by stating that “our economic ties with 
Russia remain very close. (...) I am pleased that most German companies are continuing 
to work with Russia despite this difficult environment. This shows an expectation that 
trade between us will gather momentum once again. And this is what we should work 
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on.”247 A renewed engagement between the two countries seems to not being tied only 
by economic trade, rather it seems to be a reconciliation in a wider sense which could 
put an end to the so-called Frostpolitik. The new German Foreign Minister, Sigmar 
Gabriel, visited Moscow on 9 March 2017 and on this occasion he stressed the need for 
reopen a positive dialogue with Moscow and the need for Germany and Russia to 
cooperate once again: “Russia is a large and important neighbour for Europe. We 
urgently need one another and need as good a cooperation as possible – for peace and 
security in Europe but also in order to tackle the world's many major conflicts.”248 
 
To conclude, there are right reasons to believe that the so-called Frostpolitk is not 
meant to last. It is not causally called “special relationship”. Germany and Russia share 
much more than other countries do, and the first chapter of this work describes the 
historical and cultural legacy that Germany carries. This legacy added to its 
geographical position has allowed the Federal State to become a ‘bridge’ between 
Russia and the West, and it has always played this role both in good and hard times. In 
this network of actors and factors that play a role, the two countries, by sharing common 
interests, have realised huge energy projects and trade ventures, they have created an 
interdependent relationship that resulted in a win-win situation for both. Perhaps, 
Germany’s major foreign political challenge has been to balance its Russia policy 
between values and interests. It has showed its willingness to keep an open channel of 
communication with Moscow even in the most serious period of crises, and at the same 
time to be ready to put its business interest at stake in order to punish Russia for its 
actions. By taking the leadership in the de-escalation of the Ukraine crisis, Germany 
affirmed once again its leading role within the European Union; a role which enables 
the country to have a strong influence on the European scenario, where the way in 
which Germany approaches Russia has high implications. Political and economic 
tensions between Europe and Russia do not favour a stable European security order, 
another reason why the re-engagement with Moscow is inevitable. A rapprochement 
tendency has been demonstrated by the renewed talks between the German Chancellery 
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and the Kremlin in order to try to ease tensions between Berlin and Moscow and keep 
the dialogue open. Once again, the line of Ostpolitik seems to gain the upper hand. The 
most advisable approach has always been a constructive path, which leads to 
international cooperation against common threats and fosters political and economic 
engagement. As the former Prime Minister of Bavaria, Edmund Stoiber, claimed “There 
is no greater peace guarantee than mutual interests and close economic relations.”249 
 
The results of the analysis, inter alia, confirm the effectiveness of the methodology 
used to investigate the complexity of German-Russian relations and which, however, 
can be applied in other contexts with other actors and with similar features.  
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